Authors Fred J. Schoeffler and other supporting authors
Views expressed to "the public at large” and "of public concern" (Obsedian v. Cox, 9th Circuit, No. 12-3531)
The authors and the blog are not responsible for misuse, reuse, recycled and cited and/or uncited copies of content within this blog by others. The content even though we are presenting it public if being reused must get written permission in doing so due to copyrighted material. Thank you.
Figure 1. (left) Unknown WF watching active nighttime fire behavior on the side of the Mogollon Rim above author Zane Grey's cabin June 26-27, 1990. Source: USA Today.com Figure 1a. (right) June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire behavior and GMHS travel route Source: Lauber, DFFM, YHFR website
Figure 1a. photo taken from this YHFR post: Are these numerous, up to now, (un)revealed photos, audio, and videos posted here, sufficient evidence to answer whether there was a Firing Operation on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, in the Sesame Street and Shrine area that influenced YH Fire structure loss and the GMHS fatalities? (2023 YHFR website)
Historically, wildland fire fatality investigations focus on external factors like fire behavior, fuels, weather, and equipment. Human and organizational failures are seldom discussed. When individual firefighters and support personnel are singled out, it's often to fix blame in the same way we blame fire behavior or fuels. This is wrong-headed and dangerous, because it ignores what I think is an underlying cause of firefighter deaths— the difficulty individuals have to consistently make good decisions under stress.
Dr. Ted Putnam - Wildland Fire Investigator - refused to sign 1994 South Cyn. Fire Serious Accident Investigation Report due to extensive cover-ups
Hell Is Truth Seen Too Late
Thomas Hobbes, English philosopher
A prudent man foresees evil and hides himself,
but the simple pass on and are punished
Proverbs 22:3 (NKJV)
This author's intended primary goal in this post is to reveal the truth and missing examples and experiences garnered over the years regarding the wildland fire human factors, psychology, and wildland fire weather causal elements of two epic fatal Arizona wildfires. The Dude Fire - June 1990 and Yarnell Hill Fire - June 2013 wildland fires occurred 23 years apart and contain numerous accurate and truthful lessons learned, albeit purposely avoided and neglected by those SAIT-SAIRs over the years. And further, to strongly encourage those of you engaged in wildland fire management and / or suppression assignments to utilize the best that you're able to, the alleged "official" lessons learned from the alleged "official" investigations where they always first establish the preconceived "conclusion" first and then find the "facts" to fit it. And furthermore, for you interested and inquisitive readers, depending on your combined experiences and /or wildland fire knowledge, to then draw your own conclusions and take-aways from these historical two fatal wildfires and apply them to yourself and those you supervise and work with.
This includes acknowledging, accepting, and then setting straight Harvard intellectual George Santayana's false and misplaced ostensibly absolute notion that "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." The answer lies in the context of this YHFR 's post title alone, his bold statement is patently untrue. Because of the lessons learned pre-1990 for the USFS Prescott HS Foreman regarding the wildland fire weather and fire behavior he had experienced on a previous wildfire, he then effectively utilized that knowledge on the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire regarding the impending downdraft warning that, in fact, saved lives. And once again when he shared that knowledge with others at a pre-2013 wildland fire training academy, a Fire Captain performing as a Task Force Leader (TFLD) on the June 2013 YH Fire recalled that lesson and acting on it, clearly saving lives on the June 30, 2013, YH Fire 23 years later. Therefore, the past, considered as history is all these things. Its lessons supply us with ideas and cautions, and support us in our actions – only if we have absorbed those true lessons and given them thoughtful consideration. Learning from past successes and errors can often bring us a wealth of knowledge. And, though tragic wildland fire history can be painful to consider at times, its lessons can greatly enhance the quality of our future wildland fire experiences if we are willing to accept the facts and the constant human element, the human factor, in the unfolding of any history. In this author's professional opinion, until the voice of common sense is heard more loudly than the voice of the impractical defeatist academics, this situation will never change. We will continue to be unable to free ourselves from Santayana's maxim, the flawed shared associated ideology, the lack of leadership, and their associated incompetence which typify the current approach to wildland fire human factors and psychology in the US. (Morse-Kahn - History as a Cultural Resource Academia.edu 2011)
And, of course, all of this presupposes that you understand, know by heart (spelling, punctuation, and grammar), and utilize the long established tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement (RoE), i.e Ten Standard Fire Orders, Watch Out Situations, Common Denominators, Downhill Checklist and LCES criteria outlined in the Risk Management Process revealed in the IRPG. Because based on your previous required and / or refresher trainings and experiences, you should already know that your primary solemn responsibility as a supervisor is to the best of your ability ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of those you supervise - no matter what your assigned overhead or supervise is telling (and sometimes even threatening) you to do! So, given all that, then you'll need to follow to the best of your ability the precepts of the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) on page 19 "How to Properly Refuse Risk" of the first of two pages in Figure 2. below.
Consider now the (2019) Wildfire Today "Human Factors Archive" post titled: Attempting to Redefine the Common Denominators of Tragedy Fires. Subtitled: “A Classification of US Wildland Firefighter Entrapments Based on Coincident Fuels, Weather, and Topography” revisiting Carl C. Wilson's original paper titled; Fatal and Near Fatal Forest Fires - The Common Denominators accessed from the Colorado Fire Camp website. You can read the entire open access article (here). If you’re thinking of quickly skimming it, the 7,000 words and the dozens of abbreviations and acronyms may make that a challenge for those non-FF and WF readers. There is no appendix which lists and defines the abbreviations and acronyms. The authors are Wesley G. Page, Patrick H. Freeborn, Bret W. Butler, and W. Matt Jolly.
"'We don't rise to the level of our expectations, we fall to the level of our training' is a quote by Archilochus, a poet who lived in 680 BC. The quote suggests that the amount of effort and practice put into something is a major factor in determining success or failure. This often suggests that the harder you work or train at something, the better you'll get at it. Navy SEALs are known to use a similar phrase, 'Under pressure, you don't rise to the occasion, you sink to the level of your training'." (U.S. Navy SEALS and Work Management Insights).
Figure 2. IRPG How to Properly Refuse Risk Snippet Source: NWCG
And relative to the post title, this author strongly emphasizes learning, understanding, memorizing, and then utilizing how to recognize, and then rapidly mentally process and communicate those critical wildland fire aspects, (i.e. the fire signaling its intentions0, to your supervisor(s) and adjoining forces as stated in Fire Order 7 noted in Figure 7.
In the spirit of intellectual honesty and integrity, most of these next three [bracketed] paragraphs directly below are derived from an amazingly accurate Google Artificial Intelligence (AI) response to the claim: "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
[Closely scrutinizing the phrase "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" emphasizes the importance of learning from history. It can be considered a somewhat simplistic and potentially misleading statement as history rarely repeats itself exactly and context always matters, essentially, while past events can offer valuable insights, and they don't necessarily guarantee identical outcomes in the future.
[Some key points to consider when "debunking" the statement include (1) Contextual differences because every historical event is influenced by unique social, political, and economic factors, making direct comparisons between different eras often inaccurate.(2) Human agency because people are rarely simply passive recipients of history; they can actively learn from past mistakes and make conscious choices to avoid repeating them. (3)
Oversimplification of complex issues because reducing historical analysis to a simple "repeat or learn" dichotomy can overlook the nuanced complexities of historical events.
[Two alternative perspectives to consider are (1) "History rhymes, it doesn't repeat" and this perspective, often attributed to Mark Twain, suggests that while patterns and themes may recur, the specific details of events will be different. And the second alternative perspective is (2) Focus on critical thinking instead of simply assuming past events will repeat, actively analyze historical patterns to identify potential pitfalls and opportunities in the present] End of AI excerpts.
“Now remember, when things look bad and it looks like you're not gonna make it, then you gotta get mean. I mean plumb, mad-dog mean. 'Cause if you lose your head and you give up, then you neither live nor win. That's just the way it is.”
Outlaw Josey Wales
The genesis of it all began on June 26, 1990, when the US Forest Service (USFS) Prescott Hot Shot (PHS) Crew Foreman during the firing operation in Walk Moore Canyon noticed that “the smoke was pooling around our waists like in a horror movie" resulting from impending downdrafts, that he recalled from a previous wildland fire experience; and that these ensuing dangerous downdrafts were imminent. Whether this was intuition, an (un)conscience decision, a fortuitous "gut feeling" the Holy Spirit, or what, he thankfully then communicated this to the PHS Crew Boss to quickly vacate the area and they did; thus avoiding any fatal and / or near-fatal incident(s). This valuable life-saving experience and Lesson Learned was then recounted by this same prior PHS Foreman - now the AWIMA Administrator, during a pre-2013 morning briefing at the Prescott, AZ Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) Arizona Wildfire and Incident Management Academy (AWIMA). As a result of this valuable insightful and strongly considered Lessons Learned, recall that it was then recounted, recognized, heeded, and applied on the afternoon of the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill (YH) Fire when a Sun City West Fire Captain (who had attended that AWIMA pre-2013 briefing) was later serving as a Task Force Leader (TFLD) during a firing operation in the Shrine area when he felt 'spritzes of rain on his face' and recalled the previous AWIMA briefing discussion that downdrafts would be imminent, and so he ordered his Task Force to quickly pull out of the area. And he would thankfully be nationally and internationally awarded for his fortuitous actions (Figure 16.). To be sure, these valuable, palpable Lessons Learned saved many FF and WF lives on both of those fatal wildfires 23 years apart. Hopefully, these valuable Lessons Learned will result in a much safer and more effective opportunity for future training, annual refresher discussions, and pre-SWA Monsoon season briefings, especially for those non-local FFs, WFs, etc. as clearly stated in Watch Out No. 4 ("Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior"). And certainly the inevitable highly scrutinized Dude and Yarnell Hill Fires Site Visits and Staff Rides that will follow. In fact, during each Southwest Area (SWA) wildfire season there are always numerous wildland fire assignments of local, Regional, and Out-of-Region visiting and assigned FFs and WFs hiking each of the fire sites; some while on the Tonto NF Payson RD for the Dude Fire site and others while traveling home from their assigned SWA wildfire assignments for a hike of the the GMHS Memorial Trail (GMHS MT). One current Prescott NF employee and former PHS and Dude Fire participant has stated that permission to hike and / or visit the GMHS MT is the most requested question for those FFs and WFs passing through Prescott Fire Center on the way back to their respective home units. In addition, during the off-season there are always ongoing Site Visits and Staff Rides from other areas and other entities with the exception of any non-existent "official" ones from the annual mid-March ERAU AWIMA course schedule sessions. Check it out for yourself. In the heartland of the Yarnell Hill Fire only an hour away and no YH Fire Site Visit or Staff Ride course offered. Could it be that with very few exceptions, the alleged YH Fire and GMHS tragedy Lessons Learned are forbidden to be discussed in an "official" capacity there? The exclusion also includes the professional OMNA International LLC (Experiential Leadership Development - Experience Drives Preparation) that uses these two fatality fires grouped together in their annual USFS Round Table (link) events as well as the AZ Department of Forestry and Fire Management (DFFM).
Figure 2a. 2023 Wildland Fire Staff Ride Guide screenshot depicting Yarnell Hill Fire Staff Ride image Source: NWCG
For the most part - excluding this author - a bona fide and certified Dude Fire participant - was standing on the Fuller Creek and Control Road junction adjacent to Walk Moore Canyon, that witnessed the Dept. of Corrections (DOC) Officer Larry Terra on June 26, 1990, driving a DOC pickup and being blocked by very aggressive fire behavior slamming across the Control Road. For a detailed response consider the post below.
What Happened On The 1990 Dude Fire? Perryville Dept. of Corrections Officer Deserted His Crew, Why Zane Grey Cabin Burned, Records Shredded, How The Tonto Creek Fish Hatchery Was Saved 6/26-27/90-Pt2 (YHFR June 26, 2024)
One of the key Dude Fire Investigators stated that they knew about Terra's disappearance three days after the fatalities, however, they concluded that this would have had "no significant impact on the fatalities." Really?
Regarding these "official" Dude Fire Staff Rides, it is safe to consider that this remains an informative, mostly accurate, excerpt regarding first-hand witnesses, albeit they are highly vetted, management is highly selective, and also rather restricted in this author's professional opinion to ensure that only the politically correct and Agency-approved "versions" are shared. In fact, one of the more recent OMNA-sponsored Dude-Yarnell Fire Staff Rides included a former Marine OMNA Safety Officer tell this author "We know who you are. And we have to allow you here because it's Govt. land. However, you are restricted from engaging with any of our participants." Really? What about the solemn First Amendment principles of Freedom of Speech along with the Freedom of Association?
From the (2023) NWCG Staff Ride Guide: "Concluding Thoughts - A constant dilemma for staff ride organizers is the use of first-hand witnesses, especially for incidents that involved injuries or fatalities. Unlike military battles within the confines of the United States that were exclusively fought in the 1700s and 1800s, survivors and eyewitnesses are available for many wildland fires. Firefighters who served at South Canyon, Thirtymile, Butte, Yarnell Hill, Twisp, Thomas, Camp, or any number of other fires are still employed by a variety of wildland fire agencies. Further, people who were involved in management or investigation roles are also available for those fires. Providing personal accounts from first-hand witnesses in the delivery of a staff ride is a very effective technique. However, some cautions need to be addressed. First and foremost, these individuals have often experienced a great deal of trauma associated with the event and revisiting it may be emotionally difficult. Second, as with anyone involved in a fast-moving event, each individual was only afforded a small window into of the overall picture of the event. They will have some very accurate information, some other information that may be less accurate, and will probably have some very strong bias and judgments that they will want to communicate. Facilitators need to be prepared to handle all of those aspects of a first-hand presenter as an information source. Lastly, if a staff ride is designed to depend primarily on first-hand presenters, it will become more and more difficult to conduct with each passing year as the first-hand presenters lose interest in participating in the event. The design aspect of a staff ride requires subject matter expertise, applied in a systemic way to guide participants in a challenging learning environment. The design of a staff ride should be given the same level of attention given to any other educational or training effort. Carefully designed and resourcefully executed, a staff ride is one of the most powerful instruments available for the professional development of wildland fire service leaders."
Consider this Figure 3. Dude Fire Still Smoking Snippet regarding the PHS supervisors noticing the settling smoke from former Asst. US Attorney (AUSA) Mike Johns (RiP)
Figure 3. Dude Fire Still Smoking Snippet re: settling smoke Source: Former Asst. US Attorney (AUSA) Mike Johns (RiP)
Our YHFR post title focus will hopefully be accomplished using deep-seated, systemic evidences on both wildfires of experienced FFs and WFs noticing impending aggressive wildland fire weather that was observed, heeded, and then communicated to others, which ultimately resulted in extreme, fatal fire behavior. And utilizing the far-reaching psychological applications challenging the ingrained ways of thinking and acting that may be inconsistent with the alleged current disingenuous administrative intentions post-Yarnell Hill Fire and GMHS tragedy in the 2013 SAIT-SAIR conclusion involving wildland fire accidents, burnovers, entrapments, injuries, fire shelter deployment, and fatalities. This author poses the questions of whether or not supervisors and managers are ensuring and promoting memorization, understanding, and application of the thoroughly tested, tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement (RoE), e.g. Ten Standard Fire Orders, Watch Out Situations, Common Denominators, Downhill Checklist, and (RiP) Paul Gleason's Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones (LCES), along with the associated principles of Entrapment Avoidance as a result, listed in the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Incident Response Pocket Guide (Figure 7).
See also Professor Ziegler, JA (2007) The story behind an organizational list: A genealogy of wildland firefighters' 10 Standard Fire Orders. Communication Monographs 74, 415-442.
Figure 3a. Dude Fire Still Smoking Snippet re: Rules of Engagement Source: Former AUSA Mike Johns (RiP)
Consider now discussing the wildland fire weather aspect of the post beginning with this noteworthy source document listed and linked below. The nighttime temperature thresholds are extremely accurate everywhere in the US except for the Southeast Region due to their higher humidities.
A Key to Blowup Conditions in the Southwest? Written by former Tonto NF District Ranger Robert Bates, and published in several publications. This author recalls that the high nighttime temperatures leading up to the Dude Fire were in the 60's, clearly in the Blow-up Condition category. (Fire Control Notes)
Figure 4. A Key to Blowup Conditions in the SW Snippet Source: Robert Bates, USDA, Fire Control Notes
Moving on to the wildland fire weather portion, several ERAU and North Carolina Univ. meteorologists, researchers, and interested others have published numerous exceptionally informative and interesting articles and research papers on the June 30, 2013, YH Fire weather details and the complex wildland fire weather for all you wildland fire weather Nerds. Indeed, some are highly technical. (1) NSF-Funded Research Sheds Light on Yarnell Hill Fire Tragedy (ERAU - March 2022), (2) Researchers try to shed new light on weather related to 19 firefighter deaths (Wildfire Today - March 2022) (3) NSF [National Science Foundation] Funds Study of Southwest Wildfires (NSF - 2019) (4) Convective Density Current Circulations That Modulated Meso-γ Surface Winds near the Yarnell Hill Fire (Research Gate - March 2023) (5) The Multi-Scale Dynamics Organizing a Favorable Environment for Convective Density Currents That Redirected the Yarnell Hill Fire (MDPI - Nov. 2021)
Consider now a semi-complex Abstract segment from the linked MDPI Nov. 2023 paper above that may require you to research some of the complex and unfamiliar terms "The observed synoptic (>2500 km) through meso-β (approximately 100 km) scale precursor environment that organized a mid-upper tropospheric cross-mountain mesoscale jet streak circulation and upslope thermally direct flow was examined. Numerical simulations and observations indicated that both circulations played a key role in focusing the upper-level divergence, ascent, downdraft potential, vertical wind shear favoring mobile convective gust fronts, and a microburst. This sequence was initiated at the synoptic scale by a cyclonic Rossby Wave Break (RWB) 72 h prior, followed by an anticyclonic RWB. These RWBs combined to produce a mid-continent baroclinic trough with two short waves ushering in cooler air with the amplifying polar jet. Cool air advection with the second trough and surface heating across the Intermountain West (IW) combined to increase the mesoscale pressure gradient, forcing a mid-upper tropospheric subsynoptic jet around the periphery of the upstream ridge over Southern Utah and Northern New Mexico. Convection was triggered by an unbalanced secondary jetlet circulation within the subsynoptic jet in association with a low-level upslope flow accompanying a mountain plains solenoidal circulation above the Mogollon Rim (MR) and downstream mountains."
Use this Savy Time Converter to calculate the Pacific Time difference.
At this juncture, the author has taken the liberty to delve into several of the wildland fire Lessons Learned and Human Factors portions of the post title beginning with this Fire Rescue 2 article (Bruce Hensler, 2024) titled: "11 wildfires all firefighters should study. Reviewing historic fires enhances fireline safety by building context and familiarity with high-risk scenarios" that includes references to the 1990 Dude Fire and the 2013 YH Fire. And then borrow a most applicable and germane, eloquent quote from an article titled: "Why We Refuse to Learn From History - Even those who know and remember many historical facts still repeat the mistakes of that past" published in the noted periodical Big Think. This author contends that there is no research on organizational cognition more noteworthy than learning from experience, however, in this ever-growing literature on learning, there is a curious shortfall. That said, this author confidently alleges that the once-trusted Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WLF LLC) now disingenuously claims to promote "honor through learning"" in spite of their actions to the contrary as noted in the revealing July 2023 YHFR post titled: Why Has The Wildland Fire LLC Lost its Ethical Compass Defending The YH Fire SAIT-SAIR? This YHFR blog is devoted to Learning the Lessons of the Past. Even more importantly, it is boldly devoted to applying these lessons of the past to inform interested readers for making sound decisions in the present that are to be applied to future wildland fires. What has become known as historical learning.
Figure 5. Decisions and Outcomes matrix Source: YHFR website
Consider above the Figure 5. bold statement at the bottom of Figure 5. from a highly experienced Southwest Area (SWA) Hot Shot Supt. at an October 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire After-Action-Review / Site Visit during the Integration Phase. "This was the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes; we saw this coming for years." And there were several others stating that they had tried peer pressure over the years but to no avail. In other words, it was common knowledge to many of us. And of course, there were also those that knew that there were safety issues and yet said nothing publically. However, there is one brave former Prescott FD (PFD) FF supervisor that broached numerous GMHS Supt, Marsh safety issues to his supervisor Willis and was rebuffed. Given all that, YHFR Author Joy A. Collura filed numerous City of Prescott (CoP) Public Records Requests (PRR) for his records and was rebuffed and denied access to all of them. She also filed a USFS PNF Freedom of Information (FOIA) Request, and the USFS typically delayed responding to the point that it became archival and thus cost-prohibitive, so she dropped it. It's still there for anyone that's interested in retrieving it.
We are trained to say something if we see something, however, the Honor the Fallen group folks decided to say nothing instead. And for what? To protect them? Now we are being told to "back off because you're going to hurt our friends" "Really? Consider now our YHFR 2023 post titled: Who Are the Underground Honor the Fallen Group, Couple Dozen Current and Former Federal WFs and FFs, and Others; and What Are Their Underlying Goals and Ulterior Motives for Defending the GMHS Flawed and Ultimately Fatal Decisions and Actions on June 30, 2013?
The skeptics within the Underground Honor the Fallen (HTF) Group obviously struggles with knowing - and ultimately accepting - the truth about what really happened and why, yet they are working in concert to discredit those of us that wholeheartedly support the tried-and-true Rules of Engagement. The HTF Group has chosen to censor the truth from what is and has been obvious to any honest observer of the credible evidence revealed on this website regarding the tragic June 30, 2013, tragedy history. A linked October 30, 2018, Outside magazine article titled: What We Learned from the Yarnell Hill Fire Deaths, and in it, author and former Santa Fe HS Kyle Dickman exposes a lot about this Honor the Fallen Group: “In January 2014, 11 veteran firefighters from the nation’s biggest fire agencies—the vanguard of fire, as they were described to me—met in Yarnell. They hiked along the route the hotshots had likely taken from the ridge into the canyon where the 19 died seven months earlier. They arrived at a startling conclusion. 'We could see ourselves making the same decision they’d made,' said Travis Dotson, a member of the [WFLLC], a federally funded organization that helps firefighters improve their performance. Around the time of the field trip, Dotson and others formed an underground group called Honor the Fallen."
This is a noteworthy unedited, emailed direct quote from a competent, trusted, highly experienced, and qualified WF supervisor that read this above post on April 29, 2022: "This video disturbed me the first time I watched it. We have 4 "experts" basically tell everyone to just accept you will die so don't pay attention to 10 and 18, rely on luck. All of those guys got out of fire operations and took national office jobs and do very little firefighting on the ground 15-20 years ago because in my opinion, they couldn't handle the riggers of the job. I lost all respect for these guys after watching this. They are literally just rambling and trying to sound important but the message I hear is do as GMHS's did and rely on luck, not 10 and 18 "we can't even follow these... rules, what ever they are. It's too complex". Dangerous statement. This video should be a teaching tool for new leaders, just because they have been around doesn't mean they are capable but maybe dangerous."
That Honor the Fallen statement wrongly criticizes fellow FFs and WFs who are supposed to report potential dangers pertaining to wildland fire situations chosen instead to stay silent to protect certain individuals. This potentially puts their fellow firefighters at risk. Those in charge are asking others to "back off" from assisting because they are more concerned about the misguided potential of harming their alleged friends, thus creating a dangerous double standard. The common required safety refrain "If you see something, say something" squarely aligns with the RoE Fire Order No. 7 regarding communications that requires FFs and WFs to report potential dangers. A book titled "If you see something, say nothing" by Phillip Haney and Art Moore, which aligns more with cogent quotes about the truth of the entire matter that is well worth pursuing.
Along those lines, it will be well worth it to listen to and /or read what the former NPS HS Supt. Fire Mgmt. Officer and former National Advanced Fire Resource Institute (NAFRI) Center Manager Brit Rosso WFSTAR YH Fire Weather Channel video spew Snippet from an Otter.ai transcription regarding how important it is to talk about and therefore learn as well as heal from the Yarnell Hill Fire and GMHS tragedy on the circa 2013 WFSTAR YH Fire and Weather Channel video in Figure 5a. below.
Figure 5a. WFSTAR YH Fire and Weather Channel Snippet Source: YHFR website
Figure 5b. Groupthink image and Shopenhaur quote Source: FaceBook
Consider this "Big Think" article statement about the U.S. Founders learning from history and its classical historical genesis directly below.
"The Founders of the United States, men like John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Benjamin Franklin, believed that history was the most important subject for all citizens of a free republic to study. Even those who know and remember many historical facts still repeat the mistakes of that past. They believed that the purpose of studying history was to make us better, better as individuals, better as citizens of a free republic. In other words, the Founders shared the view of the classical Greek and Roman historians, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy and Tacitus. The study of history has a moral purpose."
"Why We Refuse To Learn From History - Even those who know and remember many historical facts still repeat the mistakes of that past."
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"
George Santayana, Harvard intellectual, whose main contribution to history was to write books no one reads any more.
"A time to rend, and a time to sew;
a time to keep silence,
and a time to speak;"
Ecclesiastes 3;7 (KJV)
Notwithstanding the fact that fire is an inanimate phenomenon, it always signals its intentions as if it is a living being, and strictly follows the principles of Fluid Dynamics. Both of these wildfires experienced this phenomenon. There was a distinct calm in Walkmoore Cyn. shortly before everything erupted into chaos and the deaths of many WFs that afternoon.
Figure 5c. Dude Fire US Attorney's Office report Snippet re: weather and fire behavior Source: NWCG Dude Fire Staff Ride, YHFR website
Role of buoyant flame dynamics in wildfire spread. Authors Finney, Cohen, Forthoffer, and English et al, PNAS (2015) "Here we report previously overlooked explanations for forward bursts of flame and describe the similarity of flame behaviors to buoyancy-inertia–driven instabilities observed in other fields of fluid dynamics. We demonstrate how these dynamics force flames downward and forward into fuel beds, appearing to play a central role in organizing the convective heat transfer needed for wildfire spread. Intermittency of convective heating is then explored in terms of frequency scaling and its consequences to fuel particle ignition."
Consider the idealized image of fluid dynamics Counter-rotating Vortices (CRV) also referred to as Horizontal Roll Vortices (HRV) (Figure 4).
Figure 6. Idealized image of fluid dynamics counter-rotating vortices often refereed to as Horizontal Roll Vortices (HRV) Source: Finney et al
Figure 6a. Proxy evidence of HRV and / or CRV fire behavior needle set. Note how the needles are dried ("set") in a lateral and downward top left to bottom right curl when the deadly hot gases preceded the flaming front. Source: Cedar Fire Entrapment Report (2017), Wildland Fire LLC.
This author was tasked with creating a Dude Fire Staff Ride by the former Smokey Bear HS and at-the-time SWA Safety and Health and Staff Ride Coordinator Bequi Livingston (BL), however, countless Public Records, e.g. photographs, statements, fire package documents, etc. had allegedly been destroyed by Tonto NF and Payson RD and both of the original Fire Bosses as noted here within our YHFR linked post titled "What Happened On The 1990 Dude Fire? Perryville Dept. of Corrections Officer Deserted His Crew, Why Zane Grey Cabin Burned, Records Shredded, How We Saved The Tonto Creek Fish Hatchery 6/26-27/90. PT1." So then Livingston hosted an official NWCG approved Staff Ride Development Workshop in Payson and the product was to be, and, in fact, became the Dude Fire Staff Ride which also had the distinction of becoming the first US Forest Service Staff Ride.
So then, it's imperative to strictly follow the Rules of Engagement (RoE), i.e. tried-and-trued Fire Orders, and observe, heed, and mitigate the Watch Out Situations, i.e Guidelines, which occur on every fire, every time, even though the YH Fire SAIT-SAIR did its level best to emasculate them with their predetermined conclusion - " ... the judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable,” and uncovered “no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations or policy or protocol.” If that is "Factually" the case as the SAIT-SAIR claimed, then you must ask yourselves this question: How is it possible to do everything right and yet kill 19 PFD WFs in one fell swoop? In a word - it is impossible! This author and countless other current and former experienced FFs and WFs confidently assert without reservations the following. Despite the YH Fire SAIT-SAIR conclusion of no blame, no fault, and no wrongdoing, to the best of this author's knowledge and research, there has never been a wildfire where a FF or WF has been burned over, entrapped, deployed a fire shelter, or died when following the strict RoE and the Principles of Entrapment Avoidance. Never! However, many of the above individuals that refuse to study the historical fatal and near fatal wildfires, e.g. Mann Gulch (ID-1949), South Canyon (CO-1994), Cramer (ID-2003), etc. since the YH Fire and it's alleged established SAIT-SAIR "conclusion" actually believe that the YH Fire was such a fire where they followed all the Rules and still died. Once again, to better understand why this is the case, consider this linked 2023 YHFR post titled: Why Has the Wildland Fire LLC Lost Its Ethical Compass Defending The YH Fire SAIT-SAIR?
Depending on the individual wildland fire fuels, weather, topography, and fire behavior predictions, there are times that require rapid deployment and concentration of suppression resources whether or not institutional rhetoric and actions align with policy and guidance, as well as whether they are unambiguously defined and measured as to what a safe and effective response should look like, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Forest Service (USFS) are a relevant and most worthy test case for systemic investigations requiring fundamental changes in how the wildland fire management community thinks about, learns from, plans for, and responds to wildland fire mishaps. Thus, it requires these necessary improvements because of the alleged consistent pattern of disingenuously and unethically establishing a "conclusion" first and then - and only then - finding the "facts" to prove it dating as far back as the July 1949 Mann Gulch Fire (MT). The classic, most egregious one being the June 2013 YH Fire (AZ) and GMHS debacle. This author's intention is to propose and encourage a much broader dialog around the misguided notion and alleged pipe dream by some Agencies and Supervisors that preventing all mishaps and fatalities in all work groups is even a possibility - when, in fact, it is impossible because, in reality, the current and future state of these fatal and near-fatal occurrences can never be truly eliminated, only reduced, i.e. Heinrick's Accident Triangle (1931).
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