Authors Fred J. Schoeffler and other supporting authors
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Continuing on from Part 1. here:
Consider now two Wildland Fire Safety Training Annual Refresher (WFSTAR) images (Time of Burnover and Only Minutes - Blowup to Burnover). To be sure, the time of the burnover is important, however, the most important take-away from this - the most cogent and informative one - should be the Blow-up to Burnover (Only Minutes) below in Figure 7b. It indicates that it took the GMHS almost an hour - "52 minutes" - to notice and then quickly communicate to others and then react to the progressive benign to aggressive to extreme wildland fire behavior that had clearly - initially very obvious and slow - then progressively more rapidly, and steadily building up all throughout the day in the watchful eyes of those assigned as trusted Lookouts! Wildfires never "blow up" like the movies or IMT Public Disinformation Officers (PDO) and News claim.
Consider this NWCG WFSTAR RT-130 catalog link for numerous WFSTAR videos covering a plethora of diverse and worthy subjects
Figure 7a. (left) WFSTAR Time of Burnover poster Figure 7b. WFSTAR Only Minutes - Blow to Burnover poster Source: NWCG
Considering this quote below from Into Thin Air (Spark Notes) author and Mt. Everest mountaineer Jon Krakauer and this Himalayan Masters, source regarding the May 10-11, 1996, most disastrous Mt. Everest expedition in history when eight guides and client-climbers died during their descent is especially relevant at this point and worthy of proxy status. One Sherpa died weeks later from high-altitude pulmonary edema. Thus, it is clearly a permissible inference to include the Mt. Everest climber fatalities causal human and psychological factors with the wildland fire weather and psychological causal factors on the YH Fire, with the GMHS noticing and yet failing to heed and failing to communicate the impending dangerous weather and the resultant fire behavior changes.
"At 1:17pm, Krakauer turns and begins descending after less than five minutes on the summit, pausing only to take quick pictures of fellow hikers Andy Harris, a guide on his team, and Anatoli Bourkeev, a guide on a different expedition. On the way down, he notices clouds over nearby peaks that had been clear just one hour earlier. This is the first sign of the storm that would eventually take eight lives and leave teammate Beck Weathers maimed by severe frostbite. Krakauer rhetorically asks how multiple teams helmed by highly experienced guides could have somehow missed the warning signs, leading amateur climbers, who paid up to $65,000 for the expedition, to their deaths. In reality, there was little to suggest that a powerful storm was forming, and Krakauer remembers dismissing the wispy clouds from earlier that day as harmless and routine." John Krakauer (Into Thin Air - 1997)
Consider this Honor the Fallen Snippet of the (former) Wildland Fire Apprenticeship Director Heath Cota verbally discrediting the Rules of Engagement clearly audible in their circa 2019 Honor the Fallen video.
Figure 7c. Honor the Fallen, Heath Cota quote Snippet. Source: WLF LLC
Holding fast the faithful word as he has been taught, that he may be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and convict those who contradict. Titus 1:9 (NKJV)
According to the Yarnell Hill Fire: Findings may prevent future firefighters deaths article, originally published by AZ Central 0n 1 August 2013) published by the Global Fire Monitoring Center (GFMC) where their alleged experts say: "The Dude Fire of 1990, near Payson, is a case study that led to major fire-safety reforms." On the contrary, this author strongly questions their alleged enthusiasm on that statement because the only true lessons learned that come to mind are the establishment of Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones (LCES) and no more mid-day 1200 IMT transitions. And this first Dude Fire sentence virtually mirrors our post while the second sentence contradicts it because, as stated above, the fire always signals its intentions. "Turn the calendar forward to 2013 and the Yarnell Hill Fire appears to present a deja vu scenario. ... Some say the tragedy on Yarnell Hill is no reflection on safety protocols. The fires behavior could not have been anticipated." Refer back to the above Figure 7a. Blow-up to Burnover poster.
Next are the similar Dude Fire and YH Fire fuels images, followed by the wildland fire weather from the above the above Staff Ride post in Part 1.
Figure 8. June 1990 Dude Fire chaparral and timber overstory fuel conditions Source: NWCG, Dude Fire Staff Ride
"[Dude Fire] Fuels in the fire area were primarily ponderosa pine with an understory of mixed oak, manzanita, needle and leaf litter, and scattered large (greater than 6 inch [15 cm] diameter) dead logs. Much of the understory brush was heavily draped with dead, very dry pine needles. Fuel moisture samples taken in the area on June 26 indicate live fuel moisture in the manzanita and oak was very low (76%). National Fire Danger Rating System (Deeming and others, 1977) derived fuel moisture was 3% for fine dead fuel, and 8% for the larger dead fuels. Low fuel moisture levels indicate a high potential for fire ignition and spread (Rothermel, 1983). These factors compounded the fire hazard and potential. Fuel loads along the jeep trail in the bottom of Walk Moore Canyon were relatively low. Prior to the entrapment crews were clearing brush in that area to create a more defensible line to anchor burnout and control operations."
Consider the comprehensive Fire Research and Management Exchange System (FRAMES) linked YH Fire fuels description in the SAIT-SAIR. "Fuels: The fire area was characterized by chaparral type brush (Figure 8a.) consisting primarily of turbinella oak (Quercus turbinella), catclaw acacia (Acacia greggii), manzanita (genus Arctostaphylos), and scattered juniper (Juniperus deppeana). The brush varied in height from three to eight feet depending on site conditions. The drainages on the site tended to have better soil conditions and higher soil moisture than the surrounding soils, and had thicker and taller vegetation than the surrounding areas. The last documented fire in the area was 1966. All of these conditions combined to produce very dense stands of chaparral, characterized by substantial fuel continuity, both horizontally and vertically, which supported increased potential fire rate of spread and intensity, and introduced increased challenges to firefighter mobility. There was also a heavier than average cured grass component in the fuel complex due to abundant rain during the 2012 monsoon season."
Figure 8a. June 30, 2013, early morning Yarnell Hill Fire bowl area nest to the GMHS DZ, fuel conditions before it burned Snippet Source: YHFR Joy A. Collura
Figure 8b. June 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire typical chaparral fuel conditions Snippet Source: YH Fire SAIT-SAIR
Compare and contrast the 1990 Dude Fire and the 2013 YH Fire wildland fire weather excerpts, images, reports, etc. with the psychological and human factors excerpts, etc. to follow. You will readily notice all of their comparisons with none of them contrasting each other. However, in the long run, the YH Fire and GMHS debacle was clearly the most egregious of these two wildfires with their alleged "Lookout" being the most hungover of the bunch, even though he was never blood tested according to a December 2015 InvestigativeMEDIA article. As for the intoxication issue, relative to the Dude Fire, this author alleges that there was verbal evidence from one of Perryville inmate Fred Hill's kin that when they were at the original gravel pit Safety Zone above the Bonita Creek subdivision, the reason the small group he was with was separate from their Crew was because they had been given some marijuana by one of the other Crews.
Consider now the alleged GMHS supervisory threats to Asst. Foreman Steed, to leave their perfectly good SZ at the worst possible time while most of them were apparently content - numbly unconcerned, although shown "geared up and ready to move" as seen in the video in Figure 8b. below as they will ostensibly watch the fire steadily and progressively getting more intense. Yes indeed, and they apparently did this for a whopping 52-minutes according to the WFSTAR Blowup to Burnover image in Figure 7b. above!
Figure 8b. Image of 6/30/13 GMHS in Safety Zone Source: Cowboy Lifestyle
Figure 8c. Snippet of 6/30/13 GMHS in SZ Source: dcourier, YouTube
At the 0.07-0.09 mark you will hear one of the GMHS say something to the effect of "we haven't felt comfortable all day" after the GMHS Supt. states on their discreet Crew Net "I'm checking on your comfort level" in this "GMHS last video by Christopher Mackenzie" (RiP) YouTube video (link).
Analogous to the fatal and near-fatal human, psychological, and fire weather factors as they relate to the Dude and YH Fires, in 1996 and 2013, there was an IMAX Film Team hiking Mt. Everest co-led by David Breashears and Ed Viesturs that noticed the impending adverse weather change. There were also several other climbing teams, two of whom would later suffer fatalities among their leaders and client-climbers. The linked Mountain Zone website interviewer for Ed Viesturs on IMAX Everest stated: "Finally, on the morning of May 8, 1996, the team was poised for the summit bid. ... But as the expedition reached Camp III, Breashears and Viesturs felt the weather was not yet settled enough to climb higher. They retreated to Camp II just as other expeditions, including Rob Hall's and Scott Fischer's guided parties, moved up to the high camp.... the weather just wasn't what we were waiting for," said Viesturs, " We met Rob [Hall] and Scott [Fisher] and their clients as we went down, and wondered if we were making a mistake by retreating, but it seemed to David and me the right decision. ... On May 10, the Everest IMAX expedition members could see the Hall and Fischer parties still on the summit ridge late in the day. Viesturs began to worry that they would all run out of oxygen, and then watched with rising concern as the weather began to change. ... Then the big afternoon storm moved in," remembered Viesturs, "and that had been happening just about every day that season." Unequivocally noting the weather changing but what of the other two groups' logic?
The GMHS was also certainly blind to what was near and "courting disaster" while engaged in what is known as "destructive goal pursuit" when they hiked down into this Friendly Fire along the Sesame Street and Shrine Corridor area firing operation inferno. "Destructive Goal Pursuit" refers to the "negative and potentially disastrous consequences of the non reflective pursuit of ambitious goals. ... [the 1996 Mt. Everest] mountain climbing accident is a vivid example of what can happen when people focus on accomplishing narrow goals at the expense of learning. ... When narrow goals force learning to take a back seat in the minds of leaders, they are courting disaster. … the explanation for what went awry seems to be as elusive today as it was in 1996." Source: Hayes, D.C. (2006) Destructive Goal Pursuit. The Mount Everest Disaster.
Consider this insightful Psychology of Habit article by Wendy Wood and Dennis Rῦnger from this 2016 Annual Review of Psychology research, basically countering, or at least offering a counter-alternative, to Hayes' Destructive Goal Pursuit: "As the proverbial creatures of habit, people tend to repeat the same behaviors in recurring contexts. This review characterizes habits in terms of their cognitive, motivational, and neurobiological properties. In so doing, we identify three ways that habits interface with deliberate goal pursuit: First, habits form as people pursue goals by repeating the same responses in a given context. Second, as outlined in computational models, habits and deliberate goal pursuit guide actions synergistically, although habits are the efficient, default mode of response. Third, people tend to infer from the frequency of habit performance that the behavior must have been intended. We conclude by applying insights from habit research to understand stress and addiction as well as the design of effective interventions to change health and consumer behaviors."
Credible Evidence Continues to Surface Regarding a Likely “Friendly Fire” Incident Along the Sesame Street and Shrine Corridor Area on June 30, 2013. (YHFR website July 2023) It is also published in the following forum as: Evidence Continues to Surface Regarding a Likely “Friendly Fire” Incident Along the Sesame Street and Shrine Corridor Area on June 30, 2013. In: Arezes P., Boring R. (eds) Advances in Safety Management and Human Performance. Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE) Series Proceedings of the 11th Global Virtual Conference - Advances in Safety Management and Human Performance - Conferences on Safety Management and Human Factors - Human Error, Reliability, Resilience, and Performance (HERRP). Published here in the Academia dot forum.
"Soundings from Winslow (60 miles [100 km] northeast of the fire site) at 1200 GMT on June 25 and June 26 were similar ... and indicated a classic "inverted V' profile which is related to dry microburst thunderstorm environments (Weisman and Klemp, 1986, Mon. Wea. Rev). (Figure 9.)
"MESO/Microscale Situation Complex mountain topography provides a classic focusing mechanism for convective development (Banta, 1987). Arizona's Mogollon Rim is a perfect example of this with thermal and mechanical dynamics producing well defined up-slope winds during the day under full solar heating. With an abbreviated layer of moisture, as exhibited by the Winslow sounding ..., the stage was set for isolated thunderstorms with downburst potential. Cumulus clouds began developing over the Rim near the head of Dude Creek during the late morning on June 25 and lightning sparked the fire at about 1230 MST. Outflow winds from the storm spread the fire to about 300 ac (120 ha) in 3 hours. During the night, active burning continued with moderate down slope wind. By sunrise on June 26 the fire was estimated to be 2000 ac (800 ha). On the morning June 26, the weather pattern had changed little, either synoptically or on the mesoscale."
Consider the comparison of the June 26, 1990 Dude Fire and June 30, 2013 YH Fire Skew-T soundings indicating downdrafts in Figures 9. and 9a. respectively. Both contain "inverted-V" or hourglass shaped soundings.
And How to Read Skew-T Soundings. Source: Finger Lakes Soaring Club.
Figure 9. (left) June 26, 1990, Winslow and Flagstaff, AZ upper air sounding with "V" downdraft indicator. Source: Andrews & Goen Dude Fire Weather
Consider these AMS Dude Fire weather publications and quoted text below: Weather and fire behavior factors related to the 1990 Dude Fire near Payson, Arizona. (1998) Apache Tika Corporation (Goens, D.W.; Andrews, P.L. 1998. Weather and fire behavior factors related to the 1990 Dude Fire near Payson, Arizona. In: Proceedings: 2nd Symposium on fire and forest meteorology. Boston, MA: American Meteorological Society: 153-158).
Consider now the comprehensive (2011) PNW Research Station GTR-854 by Werth et al publication titled: Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior: Volume I for Fire Manager and Dude Fire weather references below in red text. There is also a Part 2 with the same title and both of these publications are free, i.e. "Your tax dollars at work."
"Goens and Andrews (1998) hypothesized that the fatalities on the 1990 Dude Fire resulted from a fire-generated downburst driving the fire on the heels of the fleeing fire crew. They presented fire behavior observations and meteorological observations consistent with the development of such a downburst. The observations included light precipitation at the ground, a strong convection column, and a calm just before the downburst. The downburst, when it came, brought winds of 18 to 27 m/s (40 to 60 mi/h) and lasted only a few minutes. In this instance, topography added to the danger of the downburst. The air in a downburst is denser than the air around it, so it will flow downhill. If that f low runs into the fire, it will carry the fire downhill with it at speeds more typical of an uphill run. The only reference to plume (column) collapse in the scientific literature on wildland fires is Fromm and Servranckx (2003). They referred to the Chisolm Fire in 2001, and the use of the term “convective collapse” is not clarified; it appears to mean that the plume top, which had been well above the tropopause, sank down to be closer to the tropopause. Because the reported surface winds at this time were between 30 and 50 km/h (20 and 30 mi/h), the top of the convective plume would have been well downwind of the fire when this occurred, and the event does not qualify as plume collapse under the definition stated above. Behavior changes at the ground. It is clear that the processes involved in plume collapse are poorly understood, but that does not negate the importance of the characteristics frequently attributed to plume collapse. Firsthand observations of showers of embers, increasing smoke, or sudden changes of wind and fire spread are not in question, and many people have observed these. What is questionable or unknown is what caused these things to happen, whether it in any way relates to the idea of plume collapse as defined here, or what factors control the timing and location of these processes. Haines (1988a) listed several fires where thunderstorm downbursts were considered responsible for firefighter fatalities and extreme fire behavior. The Dude Fire study by Goens and Andrews (1998) appears to be the only case study specifically documenting a downburst created within the fire’s plume. There is no doubt that downbursts can cause extreme fire behavior. The useful questions about downbursts center on understanding when the temperature, wind, and moisture profiles at a fire favor the occurrence of downbursts and whether those conditions can be predicted with sufficient lead time to allow any action. The wind profile interacts with temperature and moisture in complex ways, influencing when downdrafts occur and where they occur relative to the updraft. The question of precisely when or where a downburst will occur relative to the fire is much more difficult to answer and of limited value for operational purposes. If the possible location of the downburst and its influence on the fire’s direction or rate of spread change more rapidly than resources or fire crews can adapt, then simply knowing it can occur is more useful information. Although there is no scientific study of plume collapse (as defined here) in wildland fires, management anecdotes and physics both support it as a sound explanation for some situations, notably the stage in slash burns when the fire’s energy output ceases or drops off rapidly. The stated significance of plume collapse in the NWCG fire behavior courses indicates the potential value in scientific study of just what conditions can yield plume collapse. The ambiguity and imagery inherent in the phrase “plume collapse” remain problematic, however. Eliminating the term “plume collapse” in the context of fire behavior and just discussing “downbursts” could reduce confusion." This is an important distinction here because there are mixed evidences and professional opinions of whether or not there was a Dude Fire thunderstorm "plume collapse" when it is revealed elsewhere in the literature that there was no thunderstorm collapse.
Figure 9a. June 30, 2013, WRF-ARW-simulated 2.3-km meso-β-scale soundings located at (a) the Mogollon Rim at 1800 UTC, (b) Black Hills at 2000 UTC, (c) Bradshaw Mountains at 2100 UTC, and (d) Weaver Mountains at 2300 UTC June 30, 2013. upper air sounding with "V" downdraft indicator. Source: MDPI
Consider below in Figure 10. the June 30, 2013, 1629 hrs. photo image Snippet with Google Earth Overlay of the YH Fire, GMHS locations, Boulder Springs Ranch (BSR), GMHS travel routes, and eventual Deployment Zone (DZ) and Fatality Site based on GMHS Christopher MacKenzie's (RiP) June 30, 2913, photo. His photo was given a YH Fire SAIT evidence number (IMG_1334.JPG) and posted in one of our - 2018 YHFR posts); however, it was never used by the Lead Investigator Brad Mayhew, in the SAIT-SAIR, who instead allegedly deceitfully chose to use the idealized image in the SAIT-SAIR instead of the factual Lauber image in Figure 10. to support the PFD Wildland Battalion Chief (WBC) Willis' literal bogus contention of fire above and fire below the GMHS partially here: "... they were committed to go downhill. ... they knew that they had fire on both sides of them, they knew they had fire behind them and now they had fire ahead of them."
Figure 10. June 30, 2013, 1629 hrs. photo image Snippet with Google Earth Overlay of the YH Fire & GMHS locations & travel routes. Source: Lauber, WantsToKnowTheTruth (WTKTT).
Figure 10a. Idealized image of alleged fire spread Source: SAIT-SAIR
This author alleges that the SAIT decided to use the idealized image rather than the factual June 30, 2013, 1629 Lauber photo to support Willis' ‘fire above and fire below’ contention from his July 27, 2013, YH Fire Deployment Zone News Conference videotaped by John Dougherty of InvestigativeMEDIA as Part 1 and Part 2.
Consider now our two linked posts about the importance and necessity of telling the truths and lies about the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire and GMHS debacle and Speaking Ill of the Dead.
Speaking Ill of the Dead By Lying About Them? Or Honoring the Dead By Searching For The Truth If They're Considered as Public Figures? Part 1 (YHFR July 6, 2023)
Speaking Ill of the Dead By Lying About Them? Or Honoring the Dead By Searching For The Truth If They're Considered as Public Figures? Part 2
Visiting this YHFR 2023 post by Joy A. Collura titled "How does one effectively lead by example? Extreme ownership must apply" contains the Otter app written transcripts for Willis' question and answer speech and will put it much more into perspective reading it versus listening to it. He reminds the News Conference participants they are "You've all made it to the spot that the GMHS died on June 30th. This is exactly the ground that they died on." He mentions several times that the GMHS deployed fire shelters and died there. The News Conference participants already know that. And we all know that liars have to keep lying in order to continue to conceal the truth. So then, why is it necessary to continue the lie that they all died together when we know that is false because there are official June 30, to July 7, 2013, Yavapai County Sheriffs Office (YCSO) Public Records that prove otherwise.
Figure 11. PFD WF BC Willis at GMHS DZ 7/23/13 News Conference Pt. 1 Source: IM, YouTube
Figure 11a. PFD WF BC Willis at GMHS DZ 7/23/13 News Conference Pt. 2 Source: IM, YouTube
The author has used the amazing Otter app to capture their spoken words into a written format making it easier to follow and comprehend: "... they started to move down that hill in that drainage (5:30)... just imagine having brush in that drainage ten foot high ... (5:46), ... the fire was totally blocked from their view, they can't see the fire over in that point, so they've committed to go downhill at this point ... at that point that's when things started to change dynamically ... (6:07), they were committed to go downhill. (6:35) ... they knew that they had fire on both sides of them, they knew they had fire behind them and now they had fire ahead of them. (6:45)"
They are both available here as links: Part One (https://youtu.be/J1lBgicPq5A) Part Two (https://youtu.be/YDQRLXZV1Ro)
In addition, this author urges you to the visit the one-and-only uber-talented InvestigativeMEDIA WantsToKnowTheTruth (WTKTT) YouTube (links) for numerous YH Fire, GMHS debacle, and a few other wildfires with approx. 80 videos. It is very well worth viewing because WTKTT's Google overlay works put this wildfire into a much more meaningful perspective fading in-and-out of video footage, especially using the early News Helicopter video footage, when he reveals the early stages of the aggressive and extreme fire behavior and the GMHS locations and movements, and / or other icon entities and texts.
Figure 12. PDF JPEG timed image series of numerous consecutive photos from several Anonymous-By-Request sources in time sequence from 1348 to 1624 indicating (1348) a Yavapai County dozer working the the end of the Sesame Street and Shrine area; (1437) the Peeples Valley FD Water Tender (WT) and a Central Yavapai FD Engine with the Blue Ridge HS in the trees behind the WT; (1555) aggressive fire behavior taken from the radio tower East of Yarnell; (1604) separate and distinct smoke columns (plumes); (1608) increasing fire behavior embedded within the smoke column (plume) in the Glen Ilah, Lakewood,and Fountain Hills Drive areas; (1624) separate and distinct smoke columns (plumes) indicating increasing fire behavior in the Sesame Street and Shrine Corridor area and spur roads taken from above Pat Bernard's place. Source: Peeples Valley FD; Anonymous-By-Request contributors; Yarnell FD FF Chuck Kristensen, and Sun City West FD.
It was this Yavapai County dozer above at the 1348 June 30, 2013, timeframe being reassigned elsewhere, that triggered the Sun City West TFLD being tasked with using his Task Force Resource to construct the proposed Shrine fireline by hand.
Figure 12a. PDF JPEG images of GMHS Mackenzie (RiP) photo June 30, 2013, series of progressive fire behavior from (approx.) 3:51 to 3:55 PM facing N to NW Source: Yavapai County Sheriffs Office (YCSO) Drop Box
Please consider delving into this YHFR post for many of the photos displayed above in Figures 12 to 12a. Part 1 of 5 - Underneath every simple, obvious story about ‘human error,’ there is a deeper, more complex story - a story about the system in which people work. Will these formerly unrevealed public records change the account of what occurred on June 30, 2013? (YHF Aug. 2023)
A prudent man foresees evil and hides himself,
but the simple pass on and are punished.
Proverbs 22:3 (NKJV)
From our YHFR August 2023 website. "The authors - as well as countless Wildland Firefighters [WF] and Firefighters [FF] engaged in wildland fires - consider this Yarnell Hill Fire Revelations (YHFR) website post of special import and concern among wildland fire supervisors. One main reason is that we firmly believe that the undisclosed causal factors influencing the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire fatalities were significant in setting the stage for the overall outcome of the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire debacle and Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew fatalities. The parallels of fuels, weather, terrain, fire behavior, and, of course - the human and psychological factors, errors, and failures - are also noteworthy. To the best of our knowledge, these were never honestly and thoroughly examined, discussed, and / or investigated by any of the alleged investigators anywhere that we are aware of. And if they were - they were also never publicly shared anyplace that we know of. And this author and other experienced FFs and WFs contend that because of that, we are being taught and learning "incomplete" lessons. This "incomplete lessons learned" phrase was eventually derived from the combined Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2002) Space Shuttle disasters by Investigator Dianne Vaughan who subsequently noted this sort of acceptance of a clearly known problem as the "Normalization of Deviance" mentioned again in this edifying linked 2023 Space Flight Now article titled: "20 years after Columbia disaster, lessons learned still in sharp focus at NASA."
The article also included this particularly noteworthy quote from NASA Administrator Bill Nelson that is strongly relevant to the overall lessons learned discussed in this post when he told his agency employees this:
“And the bottom line is this: speak up.
A question, even a simple question,
is more forgivable than a mistake that can result in a tragedy.
And each of us has a responsibility to cultivate a work environment where every member of the NASA family feels empowered to voice doubt.
Make your concerns heard.”
It is a hard truth to grab hold of and accept the fact that wildland fire deaths are inevitable due to human factors, (e.g. People do dumb s**t, things break, and others get lost!). So then, given that, all we can do is our best to reduce those fatalities.
Consider here below the diverse results of a Google search for "are all workplace accidents avoidable."
National Census of Fatal 2023 Occupational Injuries. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (DOL BLS 2024).
Top Three Myths about Workplace Injuries (EHS Today 2010)
Revealed: the common root causes behind ‘wholly avoidable’ workplace accidents (worknest 2022)
Are All Accidents Preventable? (Safety Stratus 2020)
All Accidents Are Preventable. (Little Rock Air Force Base 2009)
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge,
But fools despise wisdom and instruction.
Proverbs 1:7 (NKJV)
Consider now immediately below several worthy linked Staff Ride sources, including its history, discussing getting information from first-hand individuals - especially getting as many sources as possible because human factors are rarely examined - and much more.
“A staff ride should avoid being a recital of a single investigation report. Such reports rarely address the human factors that affect individual decision-making. For this reason, providing participants with a variety of information sources is important." (italicized emphasis original) Source: YHFR 2023
"Other facilitation methods to encourage interaction include presentations by first-hand witnesses from the incident, open-ended discussion questions designed for your target audience, … “ Source: NWCG
"F. Availability of sources. A staff ride requires the support of as many sources of information as can be obtained. Even the simplest campaign entails an enormous number of facts, and the more of these instructors and students can gather and assimilate, the better they can interpret the campaign. If both primary and secondary accounts exist, both should be utilized." Source: Fluent Essays
"While an investigation report is a primary source of information, it should not be the only source of information that is used." Source: Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program (WLFLDP)
Consider this insightful human and psychological factors, written statement - never included in the SAIT-SAIR - made the morning of June 26, 1990, by an observant Flathead Hot Shot supervisor (ID): "When we passed Perryville on the way up Walkmore (sic) Canyon to the [Bonita Creek] subdivision; they were sitting there from a night shift and they all had thousand mile stares. What I had heard was that they were just letting them 'work' another shift by standing by and really had no business being out there. ... They had gotten up and repositioned themselves which probably is what killed them." Source: YHFR website - Part 2 Do our WF Instructors ... (June 21, 2020)
Consider now this November 17, 1990, investigator phone interview (incorrectly dated) with R-5 Plumas HS Supt. Kent Swartzlander regarding the pressure they were getting from two DIVS to burn out in spite of less-than-desireable conditions to do so."DIVS chomping at the bit to burn; spotting immediately became a problem; pushing the burnout; leave spot fires for dozers and tankers; spots unattended continued to grow." Was this ever looked into by the alleged Investigators?
Figure 12b. Investigator phone interview (incorrectly dated) with R-5 Plumas HS Supt. Kent Swartzlander regarding the pressure they were getting from two DIVS to burn out Source: Swartzlander, Schoeffler
Bearing in mind that most highly-experienced FFs and WFs engaged regularly in wildland firefighting can be considered "experts" in their field garnered from years of continued academic and practical field experience. Consider now this germane quote, logic, and concomitant reasoning regarding agility and dealing with chaotic situations like those often encountered in wildland firefighting and discussed below from this linked post; The Atlantic (Nov. 14, 2014) article: How the Ivy League Broke America. The meritocracy isn’t working. We need something new by David Brooks.
"Agility. In chaotic situations, raw brainpower can be less important than sensitivity of perception. The ancient Greeks had a word, metis, that means having a practiced eye, the ability to synthesize all the different aspects of a situation and discern the flow of events—a kind of agility that enables people to anticipate what will come next. Academic knowledge of the sort measured by the SATs doesn’t confer this ability; inert book learning doesn’t necessarily translate into forecasting how complex situations will play out. The Univ.of Pennsylvania psychologist and political scientist Philip E. Tetlock has found in his book titled "Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction" that experts are generally terrible at making predictions about future events. In fact, he’s found that the more prominent the expert, the less accurate their predictions. Tetlock says this is because experts’ views are too locked in—they use their knowledge to support false viewpoints. People with agility, by contrast, can switch among mindsets and riff through alternative perspectives until they find the one that best applies to a given situation."
Consider now this suitable and germane quote directly below from the book that kicked off the entire High Reliability Organization (HRO) movement in the high risk USFS and other groups like military special forces, mountaineering groups, aircraft carriers, nuclear power plants, the land management agencies engaged in wildland fire, and eventually even further, into the business, and health care industry. HROs generally endorse five (5) core principles including (1) monitoring “small failures” - (2) “reluctant to accept simplification” - (3) remain “sensitive to operations - (4) develop and maintain “a commitment to resilience” - and lastly (5) practice “deference to expertise.” The book and the linked research paper both titled "Managing the Unexpected - Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty" by Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe (2007) do a fairly good job of accurately detailing those five (5) core principles listed above.
Consider this most insightful learning quote from Dr. Karl Weick's paper because it was apparent from both wildfires that the SAIT Investigators were very selective with their investigative interviews in order to maintain their no blame, no fault narratives. In fact, several of the key YH Fire participants and supervisors had to literally call the alleged Investigators after several months to ask when they would be interviewed. The alleged investigators responses were something to the effect of they thought they needed some time off to process everything they'd experienced, and so they were waiting for them to partake in a Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) session.
"[T]he period right after the chaos of battle ... there are truths lying around everywhere that may be picked up for the asking. This is the moment of learning. But it wasn't long before candor gives way to moments of normalizing that protect reputations, decisions, and styles of managing. As soon as official stories get 'straightened out' and repeated, learning stops." (p. 109)
So much for following Weick's and Sutcliffe's sage advice ...
This author and concerned, experienced, and informed others contend that "they" (The various Naysayers, Party Liners, Kool-Aid Drinkers, Honor the Fallen clan, WLF LLC, and others) may think they are promoting and instilling YH Fire and GMHS tragedy true lessons learned for today’s FFs and WFs when, in fact, based on the alleged "Factual" SAIT-SAIR "Conclusion" they are threatening to raise future generations in darkness, ignorant of the value of the tried-and-trued wildland fire Rules of Engagement and the principles of Entrapment Avoidance, as well as the all-important first Fire Order regarding wildland fire weather, plus fuels and topography that also influences wildland fire behavior, human, and psychological factors. The alleged apathetic, ignorant, ill-informed, and uninformed wildland fire culture complex is doomed to repeat the same mistakes for which so many paid such a high price if they remain on this deadly trajectory. And they will likely continue to pay a high price unless and until we strive for and achieve those true “Lessons Learned”on these fatal and near-fatal wildland fires.
One reason may be from what this author believes to be the result of what the NWCG, NIFC, and WFSTAR having shamefully stooped to new lows to produce this desperate product! This is clearly an attack by the Good Idea People within those taxpayer-funded entities, lowering their standards by creating this immature and inane nonsense video in Figure 13. below.
Figure 13. WFSTAR Fire Orders video Source: NWCG, WFSTAR
Consider now the "Dude Fire Staff Ride - Why Did They Die?" video in Figures 14. and 14b. below. It was the first USFS Wildland Fire Fatality Staff Ride, so they had to make a good product and a good impression. What you will hear is their over-the-top enthusiastic effort to foist onto a numb, shocked, and empathetic world of FFs, WFs, and the American public this Orwellian propaganda, Party Line drivel, riddled with Half-truths, misinformation, disinformation, indoctrination, and about what they can to ostensibly "prevent fatalities on all future wildland fires." And we know that is a noble yet impossible endeavor.
Consider this open access article by Mani-puy Sally Chan et al (2017) titled: Debunking: A Meta-Analysis of the Psychological Efficacy of Messages Countering Misinformation. "The primary objective of this meta-analysis was to understand the factors underlying effective messages to counter attitudes and beliefs based on misinformation. ... The effects of misinformation are of interest to many areas of psychology, from cognitive science, to social approaches, to the emerging discipline that prescribes the best reporting and publication practices for all psychologists. Misinformation on consequential subjects is of special concern and includes claims that could affect health behaviors and voting decisions." American Psychological Society And this author would include wildland fire accidents, burnovers, entrapments, fire shelter deployments, thermal injuries, and / or fatalities.And unless you are a bonafide Nerd in this psychological, scientific realm - as in all comprehensively nerdy research papers - focus on these four sections to better grasp the overall gist of their work: Abstract, Discussion, Conclusion, and References.
Moving on at this point to the selective numerous Dude Fire videos.
Figure 14, Putting Down the Dude Fire video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14a, Dude Fire Staff Ride Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14b, Dude Fire Staff Ride video screenshot Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14c. USFS Round Table Dude & Yarnell Fire Staff Rides video Source: USFS, YouTube
Figure 14d, Dude Fire Perryville Crew video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14e, Dude Fire Dr. Ted Putnam fire shelters scrutiny & inquiry screenshot and video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Dr. Putnam was one of the Lead Investigators on the July 6, 1994, South Canyon Fire near Glenwood, Colorado (WLF LLC). And like many of us, he will always be one of our heroes in life for taking a stand by not signing the report, stating "if I did it would be a lie." Without a doubt, we need so many more Americans like him who will Man-Up and take a stand for truth and transparency. And that's truly the only way we are going to learn from these tragedies, by having the courage to ensure the truthful facts are told. Unfortunately and shamefully, our tax-funded Federal, State, and Municipal Agencies and Departments - our alleged "Public Servants" - are those solemnly and statutorily tasked with the administration, funding, oversight, and everything else, have failed to do their due diligence.
Consider this in-depth 2015 The Week Roundtable article dealing with the Dude and YH Fire and Dr. Ted Putnam connections titled: The tragic tale of another deadly Arizona wildfire. The incredible story of a 1990 Arizona forest fire, the prison inmates who died fighting it, and the families who struggled for justice.
Ted Putnam, an equipment specialist from the Missoula Technology and Development Center, in Missoula, Montana, where fire shelters are designed and tested, arrived in Payson soon after the others. His area of expertise was fatality-site investigation, and it was his responsibility to document each and every item at the site and to carefully examine fire clothing and equipment left in the canyon, looking for burn patterns. "What I look at in very, very fine detail is at the area not necessarily where the people died, but from the moment they had an inkling that they were in trouble," Putnam explained in a recent interview. "Everything that's dropped on that fatality site, I can kind of put it back together and tell you a story about what happened to the people in the last few minutes." ... Putnam, who has a doctorate degree in psychology, was also interested in understanding the human factors that could have contributed to the Dude Fire fatalities. "Before me, all they ever looked at was, you know, 'the fire burned over some people, the fire killed them,' end of story. And then added to that they'd sometimes say, 'well, the equipment failed. The firefighters failed.' So you blame the firefighters for getting caught in that situation. So I'm also trying to look at the behavioral side of it," Putnam explained. "People don't deliberately want to get burned over." ... Putnam started by making his own trip to Walk Moore Canyon. Dressed in green-and-yellow Nomex, leather boots, and a hard hat, Putnam walked up the path from Control Road into the canyon, just as the Perryville firefighters had done two days earlier. Gear and equipment lay scattered and abandoned along the trail. He methodically noted the condition of each item and plotted its location on a schematic map of the accident site. ... One of James Ellis's leather gloves was found first, rigid and blackened on the backs and palms. The fingers curled inward, as if he had been grasping at something that he would never reach. The glove had shrunk in size from 10 inches long to 5. Based on the color and condition of the glove, and its placement in the creek bed, away from any possible fuels, Putnam surmised that Ellis had encountered a tremendous amount of heat during the burnover, and from that he could tell that Ellis probably spent more time outside his shelter than inside it. ... Next, Putnam saw a mangled fire shelter, with practically all of its outer aluminum foil shell destroyed. Bits and pieces of crumpled foil were dropped at intervals along the trail, providing clues to the firefighter's movement. About 150 yards further along the trail, he found a set of tools — a shovel and an ax-like tool called a Pulaski - whose wooden handles had turned to dust. Later, he found a strip of fiberglass cloth and a sheet of foil torn from another fire shelter. During the fire, the foil probably reached 1,000 degrees, Putnam noted. ... A yellow pack with the number 16 stenciled on the front was cast aside on the trail. It belonged to Greg Hoke, one of the Perryville firefighters to make it out of the canyon alive. Thin webbing along the outside of the pack was melted, but the contents of the pack seemed to be in good condition, including papers not the least bit browned. A plastic, yellow fire-shelter case and pull-ring lay in the dirt. ... Putnam saw Sandra Bachman's hard hat next. It was melted into the fiberglass lining of her fire shelter, which had completely delaminated. Canteens, warped, black plastic water jugs and radios lay discarded on the path, alongside William Davenport's eyeglasses and the Harley Davidson headband he wore underneath his helmet. Davenport later told investigators that both items had fallen off when he came out of his fire shelter after the burnover. ... Putnam was struck by what he observed. "The sad thing is that their packs laying on the ground didn't even burn . . . and my analysis said that all of them would have lived if they would've stayed on the ground and put their nose right next to the ground." ... What's worse, Putnam said, was that the firefighters ran with their heavy packs, and if they'd only ditched the packs and dropped their tools, they might have been able to run faster, fast enough to beat the fire. But firefighters are conditioned to hold onto their tools, he said. Inmate firefighters, even more so. Indeed, "All I could think about is if I throw my tools, the state's gonna charge me money for getting rid of state property," Perryville survivor Steven Pender recalled in a separate conversation. "So I kept my tool." ... For Putnam, the Dude Fire was pivotal. It was the first big fatality that the U.S. Forest Service had seen in several years. And it was only the second time since fire shelters were developed in the 1960s, and made mandatory in 1977 by the Forest Service, that firefighters died while using them. After the Dude Fire, Putnam's Missoula office instituted annual fire-shelter training that included timed runs with and without packs, and issued a handbook with firsthand accounts of what to expect while waiting beneath what is essentially a sheet of tinfoil as a raging firestorm passes over you. The Missoula office also disseminated a national memo advising firefighters to drop their packs when running uphill. "We were losing people for kind of dumb reasons," Putnam recalled. His opinion was that the Dude Fire was a survivable fire. People didn't have to die. ... Interviews with key personnel and written statements were also a major part of the Dude Fire investigation, and they yielded crucial information that would help Putnam and others on the team understand what had happened, and why."
Figure 14f, Dude Fire Accountability video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14g. Phoenix News video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14h, Dude Fire Fatality Case Study video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Figure 14i, Dude Fire Navajo Scouts Crewman's drawing of them running from the flames video Screenshot Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Consider now a Fire Management Today (FMT) article in Figure 15. in five separate Snippets (Vol. 62. No. 4. Fall 2002) titled Human Dimensions in the Fire Environment by Curt C. Braun and Buck Latapie (Univ. of Idaho) NOTE: During the 1996 Hochderrfer Hills Fire Shelter Deployment Investigation (WLF LLC), It was Dr. Curt Braun (Human Factors) that was the one that told this author, serving as the Operations that, 'the first thing in a wildland fire investigation is to establish a conclusion and then find the facts to fit it.' (Paraphrased)
Figure 15. Human Decision-making in the Fire Environment Snippet. Source: Fire Management Today
Historically and significantly, it was Dr. Curt Braun who held the Human Factors position on the 1996 Hochderffer Hills Fire Shelter Deployment and this author held the position of Operations. Braun's briefing, in short, consisted of him informing us that the first thing to do was to ‘establish a conclusion and then find the facts to support it.’ This author questioned him stating that the conventional practice was find the facts initially and then come to a conclusion. He said something to the effect of that it was to be the ‘conclusion first, then facts.’' This author then stated that if that was the case, we can write anything that we want. And hence began what was to become the 'conclusion first - then facts' pattern of alleged wildland fire investigations continuously stated throughout this YHFR website and YH Fire posts. Consider now the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WLF LLC) 1996 Hochderffer Fire Incident Review (link) and the Figure 15a. Hochderffer Fire Review cover page Snippet clearly stating there are "no conclusions or recommendations in this releasable portion" cautioning the readers regarding the same, immediately below.
Figure 15a. Hochderffer Fire Review cover page Snippet regarding "conclusions" and "recommendations" and cautions Source: WLF LLC
When I bring the sword upon a land, and the people of the land take a man from their territory and make him their watchman, when he sees the sword coming upon the land, if he blows the trumpet and warns the people, then whoever hears the sound of the trumpet and does not take warning, if the sword comes and takes him away, his blood shall be on his own head. He heard the sound of the trumpet, but did not take warning; his blood shall be upon himself. But he who takes warning will save his life. But if the watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trumpet, and the people are not warned, and the sword comes and takes any person from among them, he is taken away in his iniquity; but his blood I will require at the watchman’s hand.’ Ezekiel 33: 1-6 (NKJV)
Ignoring facts does not make them go away.
Fran Tarkenton - former professional football quarterback
This author did another Google search using this post's YHFR title and amazingly and interestingly received two fairly detailed Artificial Intelligence (AI) responses for both fatal wildland fires and their respective SAIT-SAIR conclusions. The AI response included these relevant subject headings: "Similar weather patterns, Human factors and decision-making, Psychological factors, Improved safety protocols, Terrain and topography, Communication issues, and Failure to utilize fire shelters."
The AI response further surmised: ""In conclusion, while the understanding of human and psychological factors alongside similar extreme weather conditions between the Dude Fire and the [YHF] led to improved safety protocols, the tragedy of the [YHF] highlights the ongoing need to continuously refine wildfire firefighting strategies and prioritize firefighter safety in the face of unpredictable conditions." In this author's professional opinion, surprisingly, the AI conclusion is about 80-85% accurate!
Figure 16. Snippet of Dude Fire Investigators in Walk Moore Canyon standing among several deployed, burned fire shelters and Perryville WF line gear. Note the freshly cut dozer line to improve the former 2-track logging road as a control line. Source: Mangan, USDA USFS
That men do not learn very much from history is the
most important of all the lessons that history has to teach.
Aldous Huxley 1894-1963 British writer. 1956 Esquire magazine article: "A Case for Voluntary Ignorance" reprinted in Collected Essays, 1959
These are the things that ye shall do; Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour; execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates: Zechariah 8:16 (KJV)
Please recall that the YH Fire investigation report (SAIT-SAIR) concluded with (AI response begins here with all emphasis added) "no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol" because the official report determined that while the tragedy occurred, no individual or team member could be directly blamed for the firefighters' deaths, attributing the incident primarily to rapidly changing fire conditions and a lack of situational awareness rather than specific errors in decision-making or protocol adherence; however, this conclusion remains controversial due to criticisms that the investigation did not adequately address potential systemic failures in safety procedures and command structure that may have contributed to the disaster."
"Key points to remember:
No individual blame: the investigation found no specific actions by firefighters that could be considered negligent or reckless, meaning no one person or crew was directly responsible for the tragedy.
Rapidly changing conditions: The report emphasized the extreme and unpredictable nature of the fire, which significantly impacted the firefighters' ability to react effectively.
Criticisms: Many people believe the investigation did not adequately examine potential issues with overall strategy, communication breakdowns, and failure to properly assess the risk of the situation, which could have contributed to the high number of fatalities." [End of AI response]
There is nothing more ancient than the truth
René Descartes
French philosopher, scientist, and mathematician, widely considered a seminal figure in the emergence of modern philosophy and science. Mathematics was paramount to his inquiry method, and he connected the previously separate fields of geometry and algebra into analytic geometry.
Consider these quotes and insights from the Farnum Street website.
"The truth is whispered while opinions are shouted."
"The world's greatest works weren't commissioned;
they were created by people who couldn't bear their absence."
British writer, literary scholar, and Anglican lay theologian C.S. Lewis -
“You can't go back and change the beginning,
but you can start where you are and change the ending.”
Consider now this relevant and worthy 2013 High Country News article titled: Why are the conclusions of the Yarnell Hill Fire investigation so timid? Comments from Former Wildfire Today Bill Gabbert (RiP) include "If firefighters can’t feel free to discuss what happened on a fire, finding any lessons to be learned is going to be difficult. This could result in the same mistakes costing more lives" and author Cally Carswell (2013) stated: "Some brutal details have emerged about the [GMHS'] last day of life." and ... [their report] did read quite differently from past reports. Not a single proper name was used. And it was very cautiously worded, drawing no strong conclusions about what should have been done differently. It found that 'the judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable,' and uncovered 'no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations or policy or protocol.'”
"And though no one will ever know for sure, the report speculated that the hotshots left the safe zone to “re-engage” — to try to protect houses in the fire’s path. It confirmed, if tentatively, many people’s worst fear: that they died trying to save things that, unlike their lives, actually were expendable — houses built hazardously close to highly ignitable forests. This may be where the ultimate lesson of the Yarnell Fire lies, Kodas [associate director of the Univ. of Colorado’s Center for Environmental Journalism] says. “It’s indicative of how a simple fire can in a very short period of time become incredibly complicated as soon as you involve communities.” Though Yarnell had a fire protection plan, and the [GMHS] was formed to reduce hazardous fuel loads near homes, less than half of the homes there had proper defensible space, perimeters cleared of trees and brush to prevent flames from reaching the homes themselves. “Increasingly, wildland firefighters are being asked to protect property,” Kodas says. “Communities don’t want to hear that the solution to this problem is to have firefighters stand down. That if more than half of the homes are not defendable, we’re not going in — not risking our lives in a dangerous community.” (Carswell 2013)
What Happened in Yarnell, Arizona? (Magic Valley.com) with sections on Parts One through Four plus Documentary, Our View, At Yarnell, Air Resources, and Fire Shelters with some amazing fire behavior video footage by Jim Roth whose Brother died on the 1994 South Canyon Fire, and Storm King Technologies, 1997, in that section with this shocking bureaucratically-layered disrespectful behavior shown to Dr. Ted Putnam and the two local hikers, Collura and Gilligan. This is a must read!
"Veteran wildfire investigator Ted Putnam, Ph.D., winters in Prescott and was eager to visit the site in an effort to uncover more information than the state report yielded. But while reporters, photographers, hotshots' family members, hotshot teams from elsewhere and many others have been taken to the site, Putnam's requests repeatedly have been rebuffed.
The state Forestry Division said the Lands Department would have to grant him permission, but the Lands Department told him to talk to Forestry. The Sheriff's Office said it wouldn't let him in unless he got permission from the Lands Department, but those people said they would have to be ordered to do so. And though the Prescott Fire Department initially offered him a visit, that fell through, too. "So the whole state of Arizona can't tell me who to talk to," Putnam said Nov. 20. "I had a feeling deliberate roadblocks were set up because they didn't want the top expert in the country looking over their shoulder." Putnam finally walked onto a ridge near the deployment site Nov. 15 with two hikers, Tex Gilligan and Joy Collura, who had been on Yarnell Hill on June 30. The hikers photographed the hotshots resting that day and thought it must have been a prescribed burn because the crew wasn't doing anything. But Putnam said he saw that a lot of work had been done along the fire line, and he believes the hotshots were sitting out of the way so a load of retardant could be dropped by air. He's particularly interested in determining whether they could have deployed their fire shelters in a better site and survived. ..."In hindsight, everybody could figure out a better site," [PFD FF, PDO, and their officially designated Spokesperson Wade] Ward said. ... But the [GMHS] "just deployed where they were," Putnam said. "Laying down in the valley floor is the worst place to deploy. I wonder if there was a nearby site where they could have deployed better and possibly survived. I could see places (at the site) that survived (unburned). That's an important story to tell." What if the fire suddenly raced toward them and they didn't have time to move? "Anytime you catch yourself in a place like that, there are only two things to recommend," Putnam said. "You pack in together as closely as you can (under your shelters). And the other thing I strongly recommend is to put one shelter into another one, and you both jump into that. When you see death racing toward you, it's hard to do your best thinking." ... The Serious Accident Investigation Report (SAIR) was released Sept. 23, less than three months after the fatalities. ... Many wildfire professionals and other observers have taken issue with its findings — or rather, the lack thereof. ... "I'm discouraged with the report," said Larry Edwards, a hotshot and foreman since the early 1970s who retired as a superintendent in 2004 in Helena, Mont. "It's too much of what happened; there's no 'why.' Without trying to figure out a 'why' to it, there's not much to be learned. I don't think there's a value in that." ... The report "didn't look at anything organizationally or culturally," said Putnam, who has worked on many SAIRs during his career. "We need full disclosure ... "We the public should always know what witnesses were interviewed," he said. "The witness statements are the only thing we have to hold the investigative team accountable for the job they did — and to hold the SAI Guide itself accountable for what it's designed to do. ... "Half of the times (of events) aren't even in the timeline. If you're judging by the timeline, it's a piece of crap report. ... "In the end, you don't attack any of the deceased people," Putnam said. "You simply want to go back and examine whether a hotshot crew should be attached to structure protection." ...
"Speculation but No Lessons - Without a conclusive report, many wildfire professionals have speculated that the [GMHS] did what hotshots do: They tried to reach a place where they could be re-engaged into the battle to save Yarnell, where 127 homes eventually burned. ... "I think they took a calculated risk," said Randy Skelton, deputy fire staff officer on Idaho's Payette NF, echoing comments made by many other fire officers. (This author feels that Skelton was merely attempting to be "The nice guy" here with this Marsh statement.) "Eric Marsh was a good foreman. They were up here (in Idaho) fighting fires last year; it's a good crew. I think he just wanted to keep his crew working. You get stuck in the black, and you're just sitting there twiddling your thumbs." "We all relate to that," said Robertson [who survived the South Canyon Fire and now is the Fire Staff Officer in Oregon for the USFS and BLM. "We've been in those situations before. You can see yourself doing the exact same thing. What's the difference between luck and being good? You can't always explain that."
Citing now from Donald MacGregor and Armando González-Cabán 's 2013 USDA Forest Service Pacific SW Research Station publications link for their "Managing the risks of risk management on large fires" research paper: "Risk management is inherent to fire management, and in that context extends beyond the biophysical characteristics of fire to include social and managerial factors. Two broad classes of such factors include risk to fire managers’ leadership image and risk to social capital. The present study, currently underway and not yet completed, suggests based on preliminary results that taking a broader perspective on risk may provide a pathway forward for understanding factors that influence risk-based decision making in ways as yet unaccounted for. Identifying these factors not normally recognized and/or explicitly taken into account in fire managers’ decision making process would, hopefully, lead to an acknowledgement and internalization of these factors in their decisions." (Donald MacGregor)
Charlie Munger (RiP) was an American businessman, investor, and philanthropist. He was the Vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, the conglomerate controlled by Warren Buffett, writing on preparation: “Neither Warren nor I are smart enough to make decisions with no time to think. We make actual decisions very rapidly, but that's because we have spent so much time preparing ourselves by quietly reading.”
Consider now the human and psychological factors of this post with several of PhD Gary Klein's (research psychologist famous for pioneering in the field of naturalistic decision making. By studying experts such as FFs in their natural environment, he discovered that laboratory models could not adequately describe decision making under time pressure and uncertainty) tirelessly valid and extremely useful Recognized Prime Decisions Making (RPDM) model for fire commanders in several separate linked articles, one with a short video. Over the years, these have become more commonly referred to and recalled an valued as "Slides,"
Klein, G. A. (1993). A recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of rapid decision making. Decision making in action: Models and methods, 5(4), 138-147.
Klein, G. (2001). Sources of power: How people make decisions.
Klein, G. (2021). The RPD Model: Criticisms and Confusions. Psychology Today (online).
Naturalistic Decision Making and Wildland Firefighting Gary Klein, Ph.D., Klein Associates Inc. (Online 2016)
The Recognition-Primed Decision Model. (USDA Human Factors Workshop) Findings From the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop - "The Recognition-Primed Decision Model describes what people actually do when they make difficult decisions. This has many implications for training and helping people make decisions under stressful situations. It can also help explain the factors behind bad decisions.
"The standard method of decision making is the rational choice model. Under this model, the decision maker generates a range of options and a set of criteria for evaluating each option, assigns weights to the criteria, rates each option, and calculates which option is best. This is a general, comprehensive, and quantitative model which can be applied reliably to many situations. Unfortunately, this model is impractical. People making decisions under time pressure, such as fire fighters, don't have the time or information to generate options and the criteria to rate each option.
"The Recognition Primed Decision Model - The RPDM model explains how people can make good decisions under difficult conditions, like time pressure and vague goals. Developed by studying firefighters, the RPD model demonstrates how experienced decision-makers quickly size up the situation and determine a course of action without comparing options. (Decision Making)
Figure 17. Dr. Klein RPDM flowchart Snippet Source: Decision Making
And the RPD Model: Criticisms and Confusions. Six challenges to the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model. (Psychology Today - 2021) "The RPD model explains how fireground commanders can make good decisions within seconds. Researchers at the time thought that effective decisions depended on generating a set of options and then comparing them on evaluation dimensions. But what if you don’t have much time, or if an uncertain situation prevents careful evaluation? The RPD model shows how experienced decision-makers can do a good job even with minimal time."
This author and many other experienced wildland fire participants are engaged in a dangerous tendency accepting that these systems will be staffed and controlled by imperfect humans. If the systems require their expertise to function effectively, the granting of influence to such experts must be based on their reliable qualities or credentials. Trust works, in large measure, on assumptions about who people are, not just what they do before our eyes. Unless we already know the individuals we are working for or with, we have a very short window to gain the required trust that we need to make safe decisions. And so, we trust because we cannot observe and judge everything ourselves. So then, our jobs have been judiciously declared"inherently dangerous" by the Courts and by Legal Scholars.
Consider now some of the psychology and human factors portions of this post title. What today’s wildland firefighting individuals and units - especially the Municipal and Structural FFs - urgently need are basically the same stopgaps that the elite military units have required; and what experienced mountain-climbers know they should and yet ignore, i.e. heuristics or mental shortcuts that people use to make decisions, solve problems, and form judgments. However, they too often encounter unknown and therefore untrustworthy authority and leadership. When the requisite authority is missing, then trusting those individuals with your life and those you supervise is impossible. This inherently dangerous job is built on trust and you often have a short window of time to gain that trust if you are an unknown Resource. It goes both ways. Hence, Watch Out No. 4 counting Matt Holmstrom's excellent paper: Common Denominators and Human Topography IAWF Feb. 2016).
Thank not those faithful who praise all thy words and actions,
but those who kindly reprove thy faults.
Socrates
Many ascribe shrinking trust to a politically-driven culture they believe is broken and spawns suspicion, even cynicism, about the ability of others to distinguish fact from fiction, especially the June 30, 2013, USDA USFS funded YH Fire Serious Accident Investigation Team - Serious Accident Investigation Report (SAIT-SAIR) with its preconceived c0nclusion of no fault and no blame, and according to the insightful Cally Carswell of High Country News (October 2013): "very cautiously worded, drawing no strong conclusions about what should have been done differently. It found that 'the judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable,' and uncovered 'no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations or policy or protocol.'”
Considering some of the wildland fire weather and human factors portion, on June 26, 1990, approximately mid-afternoon, in Walkmoore Canyon, the USFS Prescott Hot Hots Foreman Tony Sciacca noticing the incoming downdraft winds when the smoke began to lower and pool around their waists "like in a horror movie."
Spend a short time digesting Crew Representative Latour's disturbing comments regarding the "burning debris" he was experiencing. During the 1999 Staff Ride, this author recalls Latour, at the Walk Moore Canyon Fatality Site, explaining to all of us that - while remaining in place without making a sound decision to escape the obvious impending danger. Was he allegedly clueless or what when he stated this? That he was 'experiencing a progression of burning bark plates bouncing off his fire shirt; then burning bark plates, sticks, and twigs bouncing off his fire shirt; then burning bark plates, sticks, twigs, and pine cones bouncing off his fire shirt before he decided to pull everyone out.' One would think that it should be fairly common knowledge for someone in Latour's supervisory position to recognize that failure is rarely the result of some isolated event. Rather, it is a consequence of a long list of accumulated little failures which happen as a result of too little discipline and experience.
Figure 18. Dude Fire AUSA Chronology screenshot Snippet regarding Dude Fire calm Source: AUSA Johns (RiP)
Consider now the Sun City West Fire Captain and the June 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire weather, fire behavior, human factors, and psychological causal factors related to his lifesaving endeavor.
Figure 19. Sun City West Fire Captain receiving award Source: East Valley online
Consider now Sun City West Captain Darby Starr's involvement relative to the post title in this article. Sun City West fire captain wins national honor for decision during Yarnell Hill blaze (East Valley online) "The spritz of rain was the final warning sign for Darby Starr. ... As the Fire District of Sun City West’s engine boss for wildlands fire assignments, Starr and three colleagues — one each from Sun City West, Peoria and Glendale — had seen the late-afternoon winds become terribly erratic as they helped fight the Yarnell Hill blaze on June 30, 2013. Starr noticed what seemed to be fire moving in the opposite direction of where it had been headed all day. He even thought he heard some claps of thunder. ... Then came the spritz of rain. “As soon as I felt that rain, that’s when I decided we needed to pull out,” he said. ... It was a decision colleagues believe prevented further loss of firefighter lives in the blaze that claimed 19 members of the [GMHS] in the deadliest day for U.S. Forest Service firefighting since 1933. ... It also earned Starr, 42, the Veterans of Foreign Wars’ National Firefighter of the Year Award, one of the VFW’s highest honors bestowed on public safety and public service workers throughout America. The VFW also recognizes police, paramedics and teachers each year, said Post 10695 Commander Jim Katzenberger following a ceremony Thursday honoring Starr at Sun City West Fire District headquarters."
If you change the way you look at things,
the things you look at change.
Wayne Dyer FB Mike Allred - Chris Own Art (Cowboy Quotes)
The right time was yesterday. The best time is now
Farnum Street (9/24)
Consider now these quotes from the astute Ivan Pupilidy PhD, the Director of the USFS Office of Learning, a former USFS Program Manager for Human Factors Risk Management Research Development and Application; an adjunct professor at the University of Alabama, as well as Dynamic Inquiry LLC, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Email: (dynamicinquiry@me.com) from his 2020 research paper titled: "Self-Designing Safety Culture: A Case Study in Adaptive Approaches to Creating a Safety Culture" published in ACS Chemical Health and Safety. He primarily focuses on the USFS and often mentions, and then downplays, the Ten Standard Fire Orders. as he does here: "Accident investigation reports responded with the conclusions that pointed to the cause of accidents and incident was an accepted deviance from rules, regulations, policies, guidance, and controls. ... In summary, there was a belief that safety could be maintained through formal written instruction. This guidance culminated in the '10 Standard Firefighting Orders' (a form of life saving rules designed to prevent accidents)." Investigations, interviews, and focus group dialogues challenged the application of static rules and processes offered by leadership, which field personnel believed only fit specific situations. Innovation was believed to be critical for successful outcomes and to satisfy both social and organizational demands. The field focused on the key principle of resilience in the face of uncertainty, which they felt helped them prepare for and adapt to changing conditions common on the fire ground. The field reaction to traditional accident investigations was one of resistance. For example, the South Canyon Fire of 1994 resulted in an accident investigation that examined the loss of 14 fire fighters. The results of this investigation was a statement that field personnel failed to follow the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders. The oversimplification offered no context and was openly resisted. The human factors specialist assigned to the investigation refused to sign the final report. Instead he facilitated the first USFS Human Factors Workshop (1995). This workshop posed very different questions regarding fatality events, which would go unanswered for the next 13 years. [FN 22] The workshop published recommendations that went far beyond the organization’s admonishment to “follow the rules”. The recommendations began to explore ways to better organize wildland firefighting operations. Three key recommendations demonstrated the systemic approach and the challenge to the status quo adopted by the participants in the workshop: (1) Contract to have organizational experts evaluate Fire and Aviation Management (F&AM) and propose ways to reorganize it into a high reliability organization able to function at a high tempo during fire season. Contract to have Crew Resource Management [CRM] course materials adapted to wildland fire crews and teams. (2) Contract to examine all the fire orders, situations, etc., to determine if they can be simplified and prioritized. Are any of them absolutes? Can what’s left be followed and still put out fires? Forest Service leadership did not act on any of the recommendations of this Human Performance Workshop. [FN 23] Some of the recommendations were fulfilled by fire leadership personnel, who acted independently and without support of the organizational leadership. Further division between leadership and the field grew with an oversimplification of risk and accountability. Leaders within the Forest Service insisted that field personnel “take no unnecessary risk”. At first blush, this seems like a reasonable request, and it was certainly grounded in the best intentions. However, the field could not comprehend the request in the context of operations. Any risk could be seen as unnecessary in hindsight. Especially when that hindsight view follows an adverse outcome event. Additionally, every risk accepted by field personnel to complete an assignment seemed necessary at the time. The 10th Standard Firefighting Order demonstrates the conundrum, it reads, “Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first.” Whether an act or decision is aggressive enough or safe enough is often only known when a mission is over. When the outcome was viewed as a success, innovations were rewarded; however, the same innovations when associated with adverse outcomes were judged to be errors and could bring punitive action under the heading of accountability. Leadership’s simplistic hierarchical definition of account ability decreased the willingness of field personnel to share information. The definition used by leadership was rooted in compliance. From a psychological perspective, compliance can be viewed as “conformity that involved publicly acting in accord with an implied or explicit request while privately disagreeing.” (FN 2) This implicit belief that field personnel were only begrudgingly following direction, increased the level of insistence that the rules be followed. The construct of accountability is also seen as “answerability” and can be connected to trustworthiness. In this form, it is most often seen as hierarchical, where leaders come down to hold the untrustworthy actor accountable for their decisions and actions (often independent of context). A deeper understanding was needed, and [the Office of Innovation and Organizational Learning (IOL)], developed a leadership dialogue around a four-axis accountability model: hierarchical, upward, peer-to-peer, and self. This model opened the door to discuss alternative values surrounding accountability and ultimately led to the Chief of the Forest Service creating a video, wherein he said, “following an accident or incident, we are all accountable to learn everything we can from that event.” The difference in perspective surrounding risk also distanced the organization from our goal of creating a safety culture. Risk management is often seen as the identification, evaluation, and prioritization of risks followed by a coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability or impact of unfortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities. (FN 24) At an organizational level, this is usually condensed in a formal process that involves assessment of the probability and severity through calculations, which commonly result in a “go/no-go” decision. Risk perspectives change as the “go” decision is made and workers are committed to assignments. Focus group discussions and interviews with firefighters indicated that risk was less of a mathematical and more of a personal process. Field personnel offered that personal risk was defined by answering the question, “what risk am I willing to accept to meet the demands of the system or mission?” The answer to this question was context specific and was based on the individual’s perception of risk, coupled with their sense of reward and individual propensity to take risk. (FN 25) Accepting some level of risk is necessary to complete all work assignments - there is no Zero Risk option. (FN 26) IOL explored what the author labeled as a necessary exposure paradox: The conundrum for field personnel to determine what is aggressive enough and what is safe enough in the midst of complex work, where outcomes cannot be fully predicted. The paradox exists as innovations, which are perceived by the practitioner(s) to be safe, rather than simple executed processes. The outcome is not fully realized until the action has been completed, and in a complex work environment, outcomes are not fully predictable. There was an incongruity between the assumptions held by leadership and those held by the field with regard to the creation of safety in fire operations. For the field, traditional command and control dominated the espoused way to create safety. However, safety was also believed to be associated with individual actions and abilities. Leadership saw safety as a function of compliance with rules, regulations, policies, and procedures but were often blind to learning about the network of safe interventions that were created each day in the field through sensemaking and innovation. Mapping the disparity in the assumptions held by leadership and the field helped us to understand the context surrounding what was initially perceived as a resistance to change. We realized that the lack of shared language, variable sense of risk, belief in accountability, and inequitable justice contributed to an inability to agree on what would make the system of work safer. After an accident, these differences became more pronounced as the “factual” reports ignored context and cited failures to comply with rules as a shift in basic assumptions was needed before we could proceed.
"Shifting Assumptions through Application of New Investigative Techniques. The initial research and investigations conducted to highlight context were well received by leadership and field personnel. This reaction pointed to a critical need to change the process of investigation. The causal relationship reported in most accident investigation reports had lacked the context that field personnel knew existed; the “facts” presented in reports could not be understood without the context that surrounded them. Accident investigation emerged as a key leverage point for learning and shifting assumptions. Both leadership and the field wanted to know how to avoid catastrophic outcomes, and as a result, both were poised to learn. Developing context to understand human actions and decisions became a central point to help both the field and leadership understand each other and what learnings were important. The first new-style USFS investigation was conducted 2007. This investigation was ordered on a fatality helicopter crash, the Norcross Fire Fatality Investigation [WLF LLC 2007], which was formally assigned to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Forest Service Director of Occupational Safety and Health convened a serious accident investigation team (SAIT) to investigate the incident, and the author of this paper was assigned as the chief investigator who transferred field investigation to the USFS Team. I built a team that included a subject-matter expert in ground-fire helicopter operations (the Forest Service helicopter operations specialist) and a professor of human factors and ergonomics from the University of Southern California. The NTSB directed the team to answer the binary question, “Was this accident mechanical, or was it human-caused?” Forest Service guidance was limited to the 2005 Serious Accident Investigation Guide (SAIG), which called for a simple explanation of cause: “A causal factor is any behavior, omission, or deficiency that if corrected, eliminated, or avoided probably would have prevented the accident.” (FN 21) Once the team determined that there was no mechanical failure, the only cause available was human error, per the SAIG. The team, however, could identify a number of problems in the system, all of which could be considered causal, but none of which stood alone as a single cause. There also seemed to be an amalgamation of related conditions that supported the decisions and actions and contributed to the outcome. No decision was blameworthy. As a result, the team created a list of conditions that set the stage for the actions of the participants. This was an early recognition, by the USFS, that human error does not stand alone as the cause of accidents. Other factors have to be in play for the error to have consequence. Each of these factors could be causal, but each had other conditions that influenced the actions of participants and the outcome. Unknowingly, the team had discovered an inherent complexity in Forest Service operations.
"CONCLUSION Creating a safety culture is a fluid construct and must be uniquely designed for each environment or part of the organization, and its evolution is likely never finished. Reflecting on the successes and failures of the experimental interventions described above, a spectrum of cultural interventions emerged as a plausible approach to improving safety culture. Our experience indicated that cultural change could take place through systemic interventions; however, the interventions were not necessarily effective when unilaterally applied. Complex systems, which frequently deliver the unexpected, responded better to interventions that accept uncertainty. Whereas, complicated, more predictable systems responded well to process-related interventions. It was also evident that, regardless of the level of complexity, all components of the system responded well to relational leading, valuing learning above simple punishment, and creating psychological safety. This pointed to different needs for different parts of the organization. Some parts of the organization demonstrated higher degrees of predictability, and correspondingly, they responded well to compliance with procedures and command and control leadership models. The extremes of the spectrum were thus defined by the level of predictability or uncertainty inherent in the system. The more complex the system the greater the uncertainty, and at this end of the spectrum interventions had to be based on accepting innovation, learning in the moment, and developing the capacity of the members of the uncertainty associated with complex systems also means that there is a need to accept that developing learning capacity is never over as the system is not static. The Forest Service experience indicates that cultural interventions can result from an interdisciplinary approach to understanding organizational functions and needs. There does not appear to be a recipe for success in creating a safety culture, as each organization will have to self-design a network of interventions to suit their specific operational, social, and organizational needs."
Dr. Pupulidy also created the Coordinated Response Protocol (CRP) which this author quickly renamed it CRaP because it is crap as Wildfire Today (WFT) Bill Gabbert (RiP) so aptly stated: "The CRP is a process now being used to ensure we learn everything possible from serious incidents so we can prevent recurrence while reducing the painful effects on those closest to the incident or accident by coordinating the investigations and reviews that are required when fatalities have occurred. The CRP uses pre-trained and designated response teams. This provides a basis for coordination and communication before any team is dispatched to an incident. This new process minimizes traumatic impacts on witnesses, coworkers and others close to the tragedy while improving our ability to gather information and learn. The CRP replaces the Serious Accident Investigation with a new process called the Learning Review. The Learning Review is designed to create learning products for multiple audiences. ... A new Interagency Serious Accident Investigation Guide was used for the first report on the Yarnell Hill Fire on which 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots were killed. The process prohibited causes, conclusions, and observations from being included in the public report; they were reserved for a second version of the report that would be for internal agency use only. ... That process was a total failure and set a new low bar for learning opportunities following serious accidents. The USFS prohibited their employees that had specific knowledge about the fire from being interviewed. ... The new protocol just introduced by the USFS also specifies that two reports be produced; one for the public and another for organizational leadership.
"Ivan Pupulidy is the new Director of the USFS’ Office of Learning. Mr. Pupulidy said the agency no longer subscribes to the one-year old Interagency guide and explained that under the new system both versions of the reports will be published on the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center website. When asked if the causes, conclusions, and observations would be included in the reports, he said they “will not include traditional nonsense.” ... Mr. Pupulidy said the information will be broken up into two reports, rather than just having one, because a single document became “lengthy and troublesome.” ... "Our view: Some firefighters would argue that causes, conclusions, and observations are not “nonsense”, but are some of the more important and useful features of an accident report, and that banning them reduces the opportunities for learning and preventing similar accidents. Having subject matter experts review an accident and provide information about how and why it happened can be crucial information for those in the early stages of their career. ... "Any effective accident review must collect all of the information, and without censoring or overtly protecting agency officials, distribute findings that can reduce the chance of a future similar accident. As we found out, anything short of that is a waste of time and money. More than 50 people worked on the Yarnell Hill report, and could not pull it off. It sounds simple, but to get a politically sensitive agency to carry it out, apparently is very, very difficult. ... In addition, innocent bystanders and witnesses with information about the accident must be protected from civil lawsuits and criminal charges."
"This initiated a critical shift in the organizational response to accidents and incidents and ushered in the development of the Learning Review as a replacement for the Serious Accident Investigation Guide (SAIG). The willingness of senior leadership to replace the SAIG with the Learning Review process was a major step in building trust in the system of incident reviews. It provided tangible proof to the field of leadership’s intent and dedication to learning. The most recent acknowledgment of the importance of creating psychological safety further demonstrates leadership’s commitment to improving safety culture in the Forest Service." Quoting here from Conscientious Objections; Stirring Up Trouble About language, Technology, and Education (1988) by Neil Postman regarding some of Orwell's "defending the indefensible" mostly regarding political language and nation states.
Notwithstanding the fact that his incorrect and off-base Fire Orders are "safety guidelines" quote, this is a mostly accurate and worthy one from an IMT Safety Officer article in the (1995) Fire Management Today article / link posted below: "Unfortunately, firefighters will continue to perish on wildfires. Firefighting is a high-risk occupation. The 18 "Watch Out!" Situations and the 10 Standard Fire Orders are safety guidelines. They are worthless unless each firefighter acknowledges and adheres to them before, during, and after each fire. Fatalities are the result of an inadequate assessment of the hazards associated with each particular incident combined with inadequate or inappropriate implementation of mitigation measures." (emphasis added) We should all acknowledge and know that the NWCG 18 Watch Out Situations are guidelines and in 1985 we - the world-renowned Payson Hot Shots - developed Watch Out No. 19 Death From Above, e.g. Overhead, Trees (in all forms), Rocks, Gravity issues, Aircraft, Aerial Ignition, Weather Modification, Powerlines.
Deep Survival - Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why Author Laurence Gonzales is alleged to have recently stated that "The Law of Gravity is always on duty." And he is quoted as saying: "All accidents are the same. All hazards—physical, economic, or otherwise—share common features. All of our mistakes are from a family of mistakes, and we can learn from them all. And our ultimate survival—in life, in love, in business—evolves by common rules on a shared landscape. ... Why do smart people do such stupid things?" (Quote Fancy)
Fire Management Today (FMT) "A Wildfire Safety Officer's Perspective" Tony Dietz (Vol. 55, 1995) p. 20.
This author disagrees with Mr. Dietz's assessment that the 10 Standard Fire Orders are safety guidelines - Negative! They are rules. The Watch Out Situations are guidelines. There is a huge difference. And this author agrees entirely with the remainder of that paragraph.
Consider now this relevant and worthy May 2015 Rules and Risk in Wildland Firefighting article published in the Hypocrite Reader by former SW Area Hot Shot WF Hannah Coolidge commenting on having and following the rules and the dangerous habit of bad decisions with good outcomes. "Rules—specifically rules relating to safety “best practices”—provide a formula to reduce the chances of a negative outcome, which in turn allows for maximum engagement in certain dangerous games while minimizing the loss of life. Wildland firefighting is one dangerous game that is heavily mediated by rules of engagement. .. . Following a predetermined set of rules encourages us to set aside our superstitions and our instincts (whether to run away in fear or to plow forward at all costs), and instead act according to lessons learned from past successes and failures. By creating a common standard for action and hopefully reducing unwanted deaths, rules increase both the sustainability of wildland firefighting as well as its respectability. ...Although people die fighting wildfire at a higher rate than in many other professions, it’s worth noting that most of the time firefighting doesn’t feel particularly dangerous—as with most semi-dangerous activities that become part of everyday life (driving, for example), it’s easy to forget the underlying perils as long as things are going smoothly; it’s not until we have a close call or an accident that we really feel the extent of the risk we’ve been taking all along. (My superintendent likes to talk about “bad decision/good outcome” scenarios—how it’s easy, once you’ve developed bad firefighting habits, to forget how dangerous those habits are when you engage in them repeatedly without negative consequences.) ... Wildland firefighter training also recognizes “human factors” as a source of potential danger. ... But the hazards can never be eliminated completely. In June 2013, nineteen firefighters from the [GMHS] were killed on the [YH] Fire in Arizona. Nobody knows exactly what happened, but we do know that the crew left what was considered a good safety zone, hoping (we imagine) to reengage elsewhere with the fire, which at that time was making a strong push towards the town of Yarnell. (127 structures were eventually lost in the town.) The crew was traveling through thick brush, out of sight of the main fire, when a thunderstorm outflow reached the fire's perimeter and sent flames running at the crew at an estimated 10-12 mph. The fire caught the crew two minutes after they saw it running at them, and no one survived the burn-over."
Consider this idealized image of outflow winds in Figure 19a. below. Outflow winds usually flow out in a circular direction from the center. However, the YH Fire, situated in a large bowl spread in all directions with the predominate spread uphill to the North. In contrast, the Dude Fire spread to the south in Walk Moore Canyon; both uniquely due in their own way to topographic channeling.
Figure 19a. Idealized image of outflow winds Source: MDPI
Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak;
courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen.
Winston Churchill
If you're not sure, it's a no. If you feel half in, it's a no. If your intuition tells you something is off, it's a no. If it feels bad, fake, forced, it's a no. You don't need other people to give you permission to listen to your inner knowing. Trust yourself, verified by the Still Small Voice, the Holy Spirit
Consider now this interesting way of planning. "Master your circumstances before they master you.” Mental Model V1 | General Thinking Concepts | First Principles (Farnum Street - Sept. 2024)
"First principles thinking is the art of breaking down complex problems into their most fundamental truths. It’s a way of thinking that goes beyond the surface and allows us to see things from a new perspective.
Thinking in terms of first principles allows us to identify the root causes and strip away the layers of complexity and focus on the most effective solutions. Reasoning from first principles allows us to step outside the way things have always been done and instead see what is possible. First principles thinking is not easy. It requires a willingness to challenge the status quo. This is why it’s often the domain of rebels and disrupters who believe there must be a better way. It’s the thinking of those who are willing to start from scratch and build from the ground up. In a world focused on incremental improvement, first principles thinking offers a competitive advantage because almost no one does it.”
The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance,
it is the illusion of knowledge.
Stephen Hawking - English theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and author. Director of research Centre for Theoretical Cosmology Univ. of Cambridge
The fact that a great many people
believe something
is no guarantee of its truth.
W. Somerset Maugha (English playwright, novelist, and writer)
In partial conclusion, please consider viewing these several worthy leadership, life, and motivational videos relative to your FF, WF, personal, professional positions, and the focus of this YHFR post.
The Collapse of Decisionmaking and Organizational Structure on Storm King Mountain (May 1996) Findings From the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop
This USFS Fireline Leadership link will serve you well with a s**t-ton of valuable other relevant informational training links. And here is the WFSTAR catalog link of numerous videos worth viewing and discussing.
WFSTAR: 1994 South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain Part 1 and Part 2 with numerous outstanding interviews with the survivors on subjects relative to the subject areas in this post.
The Smokey Generation: A Wildland Fire Oral History and Digital Storytelling Project. A website dedicated to collecting, preserving, and sharing the stories and oral history of wildland fire.
Excellent leadership and life lessons: University of Texas at Austin 2014 Commencement Address - Admiral William H. McRaven. (YouTube)
Yarnell Hill Fire video. Utah Unified Fire Authority. YH Fire Co-Team Lead Investigator Mike Dudley. (YouTube) revealing several interesting professional opinions of YH Fire and GMHS human factors and psychology
Matthew McConaughey 13 Truths (YouTube video) motivational speech
And now to attempt our best to address and answer the post title question: "Did Similar Known & Later-Discovered Human & Psychological Factors & Wildland Fire Weather Causal Conditions Save Lives on Both the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire & the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire?" Pt. 2
To begin, the answer is quite simply a resounding "yes" for several reasons. First off, to address the Harvard professor George Santayana's maxim described in some detail here in the comprehensive The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Life of Reason (2021) by George Santayana. This includes acknowledging, accepting, and then setting straight Harvard intellectual George Santayana's ambiguous and misplaced ostensibly absolute notion: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." The answer lies in the context of this YHFR 's post title alone, making his bold statement patently untrue. Because of the lessons learned pre-1990 for the USFS Prescott Hot Shot Foreman regarding the wildland fire weather and fire behavior he had experienced on a previous wildfire, he then effectively utilized that knowledge on the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire regarding the impending downdraft warning that, in fact, saved many lives. And once again when he shared that knowledge with others at a pre-2013 wildland fire training academy, a Fire Captain performing as a Task Force Leader (TFLD) on the June 2013 YH Fire recalled that specific lesson and acting on it, clearly saved the lives of his Task Force on the June 30, 2013, YH Fire several years later. Therefore, the past, considered as history, is all these things. Its lessons supply us with ideas and cautions, and support us in our actions – only if we have absorbed those true lessons and given them thoughtful consideration. Learning from past successes and errors can often bring us a wealth of knowledge. And, though tragic wildland fire history can be painful to consider at times, its lessons can greatly enhance the quality of our future wildland fire experiences if we are willing to accept the facts and the constant human element, the human factor, in the unfolding of any history. In this author's professional opinion, until the voice of common sense is heard more loudly than the voice of the impractical defeatist academics, accepting everything as gospel without analyzing, then this situation will never change. We will continue to be unable to free ourselves from Santayana's maxim, the flawed shared associated ideology, the lack of leadership, and their associated incompetence which typify the current approach to wildland fire human factors and psychology in the US. (Morse-Kahn - History as a Cultural Resource Academia.edu 2011)
Obviously, the June 26, 1990, wildland fire fuels and weather and human and psychological factors, (e.g. excerpts from former AUSA Mike Johns (RiP) the 1990 Dude Fire Investigation Summary, comparing upper air sounding images of the 1990 Andrews and Goen Dude Fire Weather report and ERAU Yarnell Hill Fire soundings; comparing images and excerpts of the respective fuels; remembering, noticing, and then communicating the adverse wildland fire weather and the imminent aggressive to explosive fire behavior that ensued on the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire, and then to be experienced 23 years later on the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire played a decisive role. There is rarely only one immediate cause of injury; there are almost always a chain of events that leads to fatalities: (1) Complacency, distractions, refusal to heed gut feelings and /or intuition; (2) Mid-day transitions; (3) failure to account for the recognized Common Denominators; (4) LCES established nationally; (5) Programmable radios, and (6) Regular fire shelter training.
Because of the SAIT-SAIR pre-established "conclusion" of no blame, no fault, up until the June 30, 2013, YH Fire and GMHS disaster, there has never been a case of a FF, WF, or certainly an entire Crew entrapped, burned over, deployed fire shelters, or killed that abided by the tried-and-trued Ten Standard Fire Orders, LCES, the Downhill Checklist, the principles of Carl Wilson's Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires while knowing, recognizing, and then mitigating the guideline Watch Out Situations. Never!
This inane NWCG-endorsed circa 2019 WFSTAR Fire Order video in Figure 13. above could very well be at least one of the reasons there are so many issues with FFs and WFs learning and / or following the tried-and-trued Fire Orders.
Detractors and naysayers historically continue to claim that there are many. However, they are never able to provide the documentation. Former Prineville HS Foreman Bryon Scholz boldly and courageously titled his 2010 Vol. 70 Fire Management Today (FMT) three page article: The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations. We Don't Bend Them, We Don't Break Them .... We Don't Know Them on p. 29. And in response then on p. 32, the alleged disingenuous Party Liner National USFS Health and Safety Officer Larry Sutton posted his three page article titled: From Another Perspective—The 10s, 18s, and Fire Doctrine and then this author alleges that he disingenuously and fallaciously attempts to discredit the spot-on former Prineville Hot Shot Foreman Brian Scholz 2010 FMT article when Sutton states: "The foundational doctrine for firefighting is based on the premise that the best tools we have are firefighters’ brains using all our best practices for safe firefighting, not a set of hard and fast rules to cover all situations." He then continues to fallaciously use several specious examples and avoids supporting his argument with wildland fire examples, instead using tree felling, vehicle accidents, and such supporting his weak argument.
"The Dude Fire also inspired the first-ever U.S. Forest Service Staff Ride, a kind of case study modeled after those conducted by the U.S. military at important battle sites, bringing firefighters to scenes of past accidents or near-miss fires, where flames could have killed, but didn't, to better understand decisions made at the time and to improve future fire-suppression efforts. "The tragic tale of another deadly Arizona wildfire. The incredible story of a 1990 Arizona forest fire, the prison inmates who died fighting it, and the families who struggled for justice (The Week The Big Roundtable 2015)
Wildfires are profoundly captive to external and internal forces. To be sure, it was impossible to do everything right, and yet 19 Prescott FD FFs die in one fell swoop on June 30, 2013. Haughty attorneys claim otherwise in public forums about the biggest cover-up, lie, and whitewash in wildland fire history telling us that "anything is possible." The plethora of the hikers’ evidence overwhelmingly disputed the SAIT-SAIR. Additionally, false contrived defensive claims thrive, this one by dyed-in-the-wool Prescott FD FF Patrick McCarty: “Lessons from Yarnell continue to echo throughout the wildland [FF] community”and also “The [YHF] remains part of an ongoing discussion on wildland firefighting safety.” Authors and researchers Gleason and Robinson cautioned: "failing to learn the lessons of the past dooms us to reliving those lessons, then we must either impress indelibly into the minds of firefighters the lessons of the South Canyon Fire or we will again experience its tragic outcome.” Even more importantly, this blog is devoted to applying these lessons of the past to making decisions in the present and to planning for the future. This is what I mean by historical learning.'” They certainly called that one accurately. And one of our all-time favorites, although no longer posted on FaceBook and / or available through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, Student of Fire commenter No. 19 Matt: “It is unforgivable that we allow sentiment and tradition [tlo] prevent us from learning anything from the human factors surrounding Yarnell because we continue to be blinkered and sentimental in our eagerness to ‘not speak ill’ of the dead. It is nothing short of astonishing that the official conclusion was that everybody involved in the [YHF] did everything right - despite the incineration of the 19 hotshots by flames so hellish that granite boulders fractured. Covering up facts because they make us uncomfortable dishonors the dead, and ensures the same mistakes will be made in the future” The utter danger to the public comes from contrived accounts by the SAIT et al that deem them and their dubious conclusions as above to be the law and beyond reproach. So then, in this author's professional opinion, unless FFs, WFs, and their leadership change for the better as suggested in these posts, wildfire fatalities will needlessly continue to occur from these same clearly predictable and preventable causal factors!
Avoid wasting time correcting misinformation. Instead, try the “bypassing technique.”
Please recall that the primary goal was to reveal the truth and missing documentation regarding the wildland fire human factors, psychology, and wildland fire weather causal elements of these two fatal wildfires (Dude - 1990 and Yarnell - 2013) 23 years apart for accurate and truthful lessons learned from the 1990 Dude Fire. And to strongly encourage those of you engaged in wildland fire management and / or suppression to utilize the lessons learned from these two fatal wildfires and apply them to yourself and those you supervise. Because your primary solemn responsibility as a supervisor is the health and safety and welfare of those you supervise - no matter what your assigned overhead or supervise is telling you what to do!
And we also know from past experience and prior YHFR posts that telling the truth - especially about the YH Fire - is strongly discouraged and frowned upon by the Naysayers and the alleged Honor the Fallen Group.
A valuable source is the nationally recognized advocate for being a Truth Teller - our preferred moniker - Government Accountability Project (link). It is the nation’s leading whistleblower protection organization. Through litigating whistleblower cases, publicizing whistleblowers’ disclosures and developing legal reforms, their mission is to protect the public interest by promoting government and corporate accountability.
No man in the wrong can stand up against
a fellow that's in the right and keeps on a-comin'
Captain Bill McDonald Texas Ranger
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